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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Although the Irish Free State had close relations and connections to the United 
Kingdom from its inception in 1922, Eire pursued a policy of neutrality throughout the 
Second World War. Although the majority of the Irish population supported neutrality, it 
attracted much criticism in Britain and America.  The aim of this study is to explore Irish 
men and women‘s experience with neutrality alongside how American newspapers as 
well as American war correspondents based in Britain addressed and viewed Ireland‘s 
neutrality. In many ways, the Irish benefited from the policy of neutrality and the small 
nation was united on a level it never had been before. However, war correspondents 
coming from the warzone of Britain and visiting peaceful Ireland were highly critical of 
neutrality, viewing the Irish as standing by while the British fought for their freedom. 
Comparatively, American newspapers gave a more objective view of Eire, but their 
coverage turned much more critical once the United States entered the war.  Ultimately, 
this examination will enrich the historiography on Ireland and the Second World War by 
illuminating the development of these varying perspectives on Irish neutrality and how 
they evolved. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Well the Irish in Belfast are just as Irish as they are in 
Dublin, and no matter what you may think of them you have 
to admit they are interesting. They nearly drive you nuts 
scrapping and brawling in the middle of this gigantic world 
war… 
- Ben Robertson, July 3, 1941
1
 
 
 After Hitler‘s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, the United Kingdom 
declared war on Germany. All of the nations in the British Commonwealth followed suit; 
that is, all save the Irish Free State. Instead of belligerency, Eire experienced ―the 
Emergency‖ under Taoiseach Eamon de Valera from September 1939 until September 
1946. Shortly after Britain‘s declaration of war on Germany, de Valera along with the 
Irish Parliament, Dail Eireann, passed the Emergency Powers Act, which stipulated the 
course of neutrality that Ireland would pursue while giving the Irish government the 
authority to implement that policy. Throughout the entire war, this policy of neutrality 
would be protested and critiqued. It was ridiculed on many occasions by the British 
government and press along with many Americans who lived and experienced the war 
from Great Britain, such as U.S. war correspondents. As the war progressed an increasing 
number of Americans grew more critical of Eire‘s neutral stance, especially after the 
United States entered the war in December of 1941, and this was reflected in American 
press coverage.  
 Those who chastised Irish neutrality did so for a number of reasons; most 
important being that Ireland‘s fate was directly related to Great Britain‘s. If the British 
                                                 
1 Ben Robertson, Cable from Belfast to New York, July 3, 1941, Mss. 77 Ben 
Robertson Papers, Clemson University Special Collections Library. Referred to 
hereafter as Ben Robertson Papers. 
 2 
fell to Nazi Germany, then Ireland would easily be overtaken as well. The British along 
with American war correspondents saw Irish neutrality as selfish. In this view, the British 
were sacrificing themselves and their nation for the cause of western civilization, while 
Eire remained neutral. In addition, the Irish were portrayed as unhelpful on many 
occasions—the largest being the issue over Irish ports. In 1938 Great Britain relinquished 
military control over three Irish seaports: Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly. They did 
so anticipating closer relations and potential use of these bases in the event of warfare. 
However, the Irish did not allow the British military to use these ports during the Second 
World War because that would have violated their position of neutrality. British as well 
as American press coverage dwelled on this issue of Irish ports, presenting it as 
detrimental to the British war effort. Not only were American war correspondents and 
newspapers critical of Irish neutrality because of issues such as the ports, but also 
because it did not make sense to them while looking at the larger picture the Second 
World War. The Irish government and Irish people had deep connections with Great 
Britain, both physically and emotionally—whether with the United Kingdom as their 
largest trading partner or with the extremely large Irish minority living and working in 
Britain. Yet, as opponents of Irish neutrality saw it, Ireland continued to allow the British 
to stand alone against the horrific threats posed by Nazi Germany. 
 Many Americans ridiculed Ireland‘s neutrality in the early part of the war, but the 
United States also pursued a policy of neutrality until the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
Although this seems hypocritical, American war correspondents who reported on Ireland 
saw the Irish experience during the war in comparison with what they witnessed in Great 
 3 
Britain. Irish neutrality utterly perplexed these foreign onlookers. The critiques these 
journalists gave Irish neutrality are seen sporadically in American newspapers before 
1942—a large number of articles pertaining to the war were written by the very same 
correspondents—but American press coverage additionally explained the contours of 
Irish neutrality from the Irish perspective. Major U.S. newspapers, such as the New York 
Times, covered Irish neutrality much more objectively until the United States entered and 
had a much larger stake in the war. These criticisms by American journalists and 
newspapers emphasized the selfish nature of Ireland‘s neutrality. They saw the Irish as 
siting out of a conflict which was going to determine their fate as much as Great 
Britain‘s. However, the press coverage also largely ignored the role that Ireland did play 
in the war. Tens of thousands of Irish men and women joined the British military, which 
the Irish government never inhibited throughout the war. Many aspects of Irish 
benevolence towards the Allies were unknown to these critics and would remain 
obscured for decades after the war, notably the Irish government‘s sharing of intelligence 
and information with the Allies.
2
  From what these American reporters saw, it is not 
difficult to understand why they would be perplexed and frustrated by Ireland‘s 
neutrality. 
 Yet, in the face of all this criticism regarding their neutrality, for Ireland, it was 
the most logical position to take throughout the Second World War. Politically, neutrality 
was supported by the majority of the nation—a policy that united factions from both sides 
of the Irish Civil War, which was fought less than two decades before World War II. The 
                                                 
2 Eunan O‘Halpin, Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality the Second 
World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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Irish could not and would not ally with Great Britain.  The Irish saw the British as 
century-old enemies from whom they only gained independence in 1922. When looking 
back upon British rule, they saw the British as callous oppressors. From the potato famine 
along with inequalities such as the Penal laws of the 18
th
 century to the ruthlessness of 
the Black and Tans during the War of Independence, the Irish saw a consistent struggle 
against the unjust British rule. If they allied with the United Kingdom, it would only 
create discontent within Irish society, whose historical memory of British aggression 
would rebel against supporting a British war effort. Not only that, but in remaining 
neutral the newly independent Irish state was able to assert sovereignty over their own 
nation while also refusing to accept what they saw as the unjust Partition of Ireland 
(having the six counties of Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom).   
 Beyond these political calculations, neutrality meant that Ireland was able to 
avoid the devastating impacts of the Second World War. Ireland did not have its cities 
blitzed and tens of thousands of its civilians killed and injured compared to the United 
Kingdom. Instead, Ireland and her people felt the less drastic side effects of the war. 
There was rationing throughout Ireland, which hurt the poorest sections of Irish society, 
but life went on. People enjoyed the bars, dances, plays, and cultural scene that Irish 
society had to offer—largely because the war inhibited the Irish people from leaving their 
―tiny little world‖ on the edge of major conflict.3 It was very difficult to leave Ireland 
during this time. The Irish were touched by the war in other ways as well.  Victims from 
the Battles of the Atlantic would wash up on Eire‘s shores, pilots would crash land 
                                                 
3 Ben Robertson, I Saw England (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), 186. 
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throughout the country, and occasionally, bombs were ―accidently‖ dropped on Eire. 
Although the Irish felt some impacts of the war, one can see the benefits of remaining 
neutral while the rest of Europe engaged in a devastating world war.  
 The critics, such as American war correspondents, saw these benefits that the Irish 
had by remaining neutral and it led them to further criticize and despise the Irish position 
of neutrality. They came to Ireland from Great Britain and saw the ―bright lights‖ of 
Dublin not under blackout, unrationed foods, such as butter and eggs, the obliviousness 
that the Irish displayed towards the war.  In spite of being told the rationale behind Irish 
neutrality, they could not comprehend how and why the Irish did not see the larger 
picture: that their whole world was at stake while they remained at peace. These critics, 
for right or for wrong, did not and would not see eye-to-eye with the Irish perspective. It 
was not difficult for contemporaries to see that Ireland‘s well-being was directly related 
to the British, yet at the same time, it also is not surprising that a large majority of Irish 
men and women supported neutrality. Therefore, the aim of the following chapters is to 
closely examine these differing perspectives on Irish neutrality. First, to understand, why 
the Irish, even some who physically and emotionally backed the British war effort, could 
also support such a policy of neutrality. The second goal is to analyze how American 
reporters and newspapers grappled with understanding and then explaining Irish 
neutrality, a political position that seemed to them preposterous at times.  
  Chapter I explores the historiography of neutral Ireland, which has only 
blossomed in the past thirty years—showing how the historical understanding of 
Ireland‘s experience with the war has evolved from a purely political analysis on Irish 
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neutrality to an examination of the cultural and social impacts that the war had on the 
Irish people. In looking at the historiographical interpretations of Irish neutrality, one can 
further understand the ways in which the Irish government and people participated in and 
were affected by the Second World War. Historical scholarship on Eire highlights how 
and why neutrality worked throughout Ireland during the Second World War.  
 Building on this historiography, Chapter II aims to broaden the understanding of 
the Irish perspective on neutrality by exploring first-hand accounts of Irish men and 
women with the war. This chapter highlights the benefits that neutrality had within 
Ireland, such as uniting this historically factious population under the common cause of 
neutrality. It also looks at several memoirs of the Irish who fought for the British armed 
forces in order to better understand how being from Ireland, a neutral nation, affected 
their experiences throughout the war. This memoir literature demonstrates the 
connections that Irish men and women had with one another while a part of the British 
military as well as displaying how these Irish combatants never ridiculed de Valera‘s 
neutral stance in their recollections.  
 After delving into the Irish perspective, Chapter III studies some of the major 
critics of Irish neutrality: American war correspondents. This chapter, alongside the 
previous one, illuminates the stark differences on this issue throughout the Second World 
War. These Americans viewed the war as the British did, a fight for their livelihood, for 
freedom and democracy. In comparison, they visited Ireland and saw that the Irish people 
were whole-heartedly supportive of neutrality and, in instances, completely ignorant to 
their surroundings while the United Kingdom fought for both their lives. American war 
 7 
correspondents reflected their concern for Great Britain and the British war effort. They 
saw the destruction in England, and were appalled by the lack of concern or help from 
across the Irish Sea.  
 Whereas American war correspondents viewed Irish neutrality in comparison to 
their experiences in Great Britain and throughout the war, reflecting a British point of 
view, the coverage on Eire given by American newspapers is more reflective of the 
changing position of the United States towards the war. Chapter IV looks at how the U.S. 
coverage on Eire evolved as the position of the United States changed. It explores the 
major U.S. papers, such as the New York Times and Washington Post, highlighting that 
before Pearl Harbor many Americans, especially those of Irish decent, supported and 
understood Eire‘s neutrality, but after the United States entered the war, American papers 
no longer reflected the same understanding or support of Irish neutrality. By examining 
these differing vantage points this thesis illuminates how different perspectives on Irish 
neutrality evolved over the course of the war. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
UNNEUTRAL NEUTRAL EIRE: THE HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 OF EIRE AND “THE EMERGENCY” 
 
Although the Second World War was one of the most critical moments in modern 
European history, historical scholarship on Ireland‘s experience with neutrality during the 
war has, until recently, been relatively limited.  Not until the late 1970s did historians 
begin to study World War II with a major focus on Ireland. The first of these studies 
concentrated on the political and diplomatic relations between Eire and the respective 
belligerents, with seminal works such as Robert Fisk‘s In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster 
and the Price of Neutrality (1983).
4
   Over the years, scholarship expanded to include a 
wide range of topics regarding Ireland, her people, and the experiences of this nation on 
the edge of the global conflict.  The significant impacts that warfare had on this tiny, 
neutral nation are evident from almost every perspective:  Clair Wills‘ That Neutral 
Island: A Cultural History of Ireland, which focuses on the cultural impacts of the war, to 
Eunan O‘Halpin‘s Spying on Ireland, which analyzes the British intelligence in Ireland 
during the war.
5
  
Several factors have influenced the expansion of this historiography over the past 
thirty years.  Of key significance was the opening of archival material from the wartime 
                                                 
4 Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality, 1939-45 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1983). 
5
 Eunan O‘Halpin, Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality During the 
Second World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Clair Wills, That 
Neutral Island:  A Cultural History of Ireland during the Second World War (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard UP, 2007). 
 9 
years.  The growing studies on Irish neutrality correspond with the growing availability 
of documents pertaining to British, Irish, and Northern Irish wartime policies, military 
operations, intelligence, and diplomatic interactions.  For instance, Robert Fisk was able 
to complete In Time of War in 1982 by utilizing confidential wartime papers released for 
him by the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Office, while Eunan O‘Halpin was 
the first to take advantage of top-secret intelligence and military documents released by 
the British government in 2006.  In addition to fresh sources, the emergence of this 
historiography coincided with the mainstreaming of Irish Revisionism.  Revisionism was 
an attempt to view Ireland‘s past objectively, looking beyond strong religious, political, 
or nationalistic sentiments, which have skewed the historical memories of Ireland and her 
people, fueling tensions and violence throughout the 20
th
 century. Efforts to revise this 
historical understanding began in the 1930s, and the mission of revisionist histories ―was 
to cleanse the historical record of its mythological clutter…by applying scientific 
methods to the evidence, separating fact from destructive and divisive fiction.‖6 Yet it 
wasn‘t until the outbreak of the ―Troubles‖ in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s that it 
became clear to many historians, ―that the Irish people needed liberation from the 
nationalist mythology.‖7   
Before the mainstreaming of Irish revisionism, nationalist perspectives that 
glorified Ireland‘s past leaders and struggles against brutal British rule dominated the 
                                                 
6
 Nancy J. Curtin, ―Varieties of Irishness: Historical Revisionism, Irish Style,‖ Journal of 
British Studies 35, no. 2 (April 1996), 195. 
7
 Ibid. 
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history and memory of the Irish nation.
8
  Historians looked at Ireland‘s past in order to 
justify its struggle against Great Britain and Irish animosity towards partition and their 
former ―colonizer.‖ Therefore, as the atrocities of the Second World War became clear, it 
was better for nationalist historians to ignore Ireland‘s neutral polices in their histories 
rather than to risk portraying the Irish nation in a negative light. It wasn‘t until Irish 
revisionism replaced the dominant nationalist approach to Irish history, that historians 
critically looked at Irish neutrality with both its positive and negative consequences. 
Despite their various foci and methodologies, every historian discussed here 
emphasizes Ireland‘s history and relationship to Great Britain. Before, during, and after 
the war, tens of thousands of Irish men and women lived and worked in Great Britain, 
and the British remained the largest and most vital trading partner to Eire.  At the same 
time, the twenty-six counties of the Irish Free State gained independence from Britain 
only seventeen years before the outbreak of the Second World War, with a large portion 
of the Irish still embittered about centuries of British oppression and their control of 
Northern Ireland.  Because of this strange relationship with Great Britain, in which 
Ireland was embittered yet dependent towards its more powerful neighbor and oppressor, 
the common consensus amongst historians is that neutrality was the most practical 
political policy for Ireland. 
                                                 
8
 Roy Foster, ―History and the Irish Question,‖ in Interpreting Irish History: The Debate 
on Historical Revisionism, comp. Ciaran Brady (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994). 
 11 
For some historians, Ireland‘s history with Britain and the issues over partition are 
at the core of Eire‘s neutral policies.9 The memories of the Anglo-Irish war and Irish 
Civil war were still fresh in the minds of the population in 1939, and a majority of Irish 
society supported de Valera‘s policy to remain neutral. Historians also acknowledge that 
Ireland was not militarily equipped to fight in the war, and many, such as Donal 
O‘Drisceoil, note that neutrality was a part of asserting both Irish sovereignty and the 
rights of small nations.
10
  Ireland remained neutral for many reasons, yet a unique 
characteristic of this neutrality which historians also emphasize was Irish benevolence 
towards the Allies. Irish men volunteered for the British military, British soldiers who 
crashed landed in Eire were not interned (unlike their German counterparts), and the Irish 
even relayed intelligence to the British.  Another crucial element that continues to prevail 
in each historical account is the dispute over Irish ports.  As stated in the introduction, 
Britain ceded control of several Irish ports (Berehaven, Lough Swilly, and Cobh) in 1938, 
but with the outbreak of war, the British saw the Irish ports as key to their success in the 
Battle of the Atlantic and thus to victory overall.
11
  All of these historians would agree on 
these key characteristics of Irish neutrality, but they each have looked at Ireland during 
the Second World War through varying lenses, and have highlighted the multiplicity of 
consequences in Ireland‘s neutral stance. In general, the pattern of this historiography is 
                                                 
9
 Fisk, In Time of War; Jerrold M. Packard, Neither Friend Nor Foe: The European 
Neutrals in World War II (New York: Scribner, 1992).  
10
 Donal O‘Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: Neutrality, Politics, and Society 
(Cork: Cork UP, 1996), 3. 
11 See page 2. 
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that it has expanded from a purely political historical approach to cultural or social 
interpretations. 
 Robert Fisk‘s political study of neutral Eire opened the door to this historiography 
by exploring a topic that had previously ―been a largely unknown and comparatively 
unwritten chapter in the history of the Second World War.‖12  Fisk‘s study is based on 
over 11,000 wartime documents and memoranda in London, Belfast, and Dublin.
13
  In 
this large and heavily detailed volume, he examines the decision-making of the dominant 
figures from the governments of Eire, Britain, and Northern Ireland. Throughout the book 
he emphasizes the vital role that the partition of Northern Ireland played, which was not 
only a legacy of Ireland‘s relationship to Britain but also representative of the long-
disagreements between the two nations. Fisk begins his work with the British turning 
over Irish ports in 1938, an issue that plagued the two nations for the remainder the war 
as Britain desperately sought to use them.  From there the book is organized 
chronologically, giving a political play-by-play account surrounding Ireland and the 
Second World War.  Each chapter discusses major issues that developed throughout the 
war, such as Britain‘s offer to end partition in 1940 if Ireland entered the war, or 
Germany‘s ―Operation Green,‖ that involved an amphibious landing in Ireland, as well as 
the fears Ireland had of a British invasion.
14
  
At each stage of the war, Fisk highlights the personal characteristics of the major 
leaders involved, such as Eamon de Valera or Winston Churchill, and how they 
                                                 
12
 Fisk, In Time of War, x. 
13
 Fisk, In Time of War, x. 
14
 Ibid., 189. 
 13 
influenced the decision making for each country. For instance, de Valera could 
sympathize with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi‘s argument about the Sudetenland during the 
Munich conference because the Irish Free State felt that it should control the six counties 
of Northern Ireland since it not only held a large minority of Irish Catholics but also it 
was viewed as a rightful part of Eire.
15
 Churchill‘s ambiguous attitude towards Irish 
neutrality in turn created confusion in Britain‘s policies because he would sometimes 
loathe de Valera and find Irish neutrality as incomprehensible, while at other times he 
would admire the Irish effort.  
Fisk concludes the book by summarizing the ―price‖ Ireland paid for its policy of 
neutrality and with a brief hypothetical explanation on what could have happened if 
Ireland had chosen to join the Allies.  According to Fisk, if Ireland opened its ports to 
Britain as an ally, then the war in the Atlantic could have ended sooner, resulting in fewer 
deaths, and the invasion of Normandy might have taken place months before. He even 
hypothesizes that Russia might not have had time to reinvade Poland, which could have 
dramatically changed post-war Europe.
16
  Fisk is not the only historian to conjecture at 
what could have happened, but his is by far the most optimistic interpretation. Others 
believe that Germany would have invaded Ireland if she joined the Allies.
17
  Regardless 
of what could have happened if Ireland changed its policy, Fisk outlines the 
consequences of the policy Ireland pursued.  After the war, Ireland was denied 
acceptance to the United Nations until 1955 because of its neutrality, and as a result of 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., 49. 
16
 Fisk, In Time of War, 475. 
17
 Tony Gray, The Lost Years: The Emergency in Ireland, 1939-45 (London: Warner, 
1998), 211. 
 14 
the extreme censorship in Ireland a lot of the Nazi atrocities, including the Holocaust, 
were difficult for the Irish to comprehend.  The most lasting consequence for Anglo-Irish 
relations in Second World War, Fisk argues, was to make partition more fixed. ―Both the 
Dublin and Belfast Governments used the war,‖ Fisk concludes, ―the first to assert Eire‘s 
sovereignty, the second to secure further Northern Ireland‘s place within the United 
Kingdom‖18     
Around the same time as Robert Fisk‘s book was published, T. Ryle Dwyer wrote 
a diplomatic history of Ireland during World War II, Irish Neutrality and the USA 1939-
1947 (1977).
19
 Dwyer was the first historian to focus primarily on the diplomatic 
interactions between Ireland and the United States, whereas Fisk gave more of a 
comprehensive overview of Ireland‘s political history during the war, emphasizing 
Anglo-Irish relations.  Both are similar in methodology; Dwyer concentrates on the U.S. 
Ambassador to Ireland, David Gray, and his interactions with Ireland during the war.  
Dwyer argues that Ireland played a prominent role in the diplomacy of World War II 
even though it was a small island of barely three million people, and that Eire‘s neutrality 
cannot be understood without looking at its interactions with the United States.  Claiming 
that, ―during the Second World War the Irish-American influence on United States 
politics played a very important role in shaping both British and American policy towards 
Ireland.‖20  Dwyer argues that without the support of Irish-Americans, Washington could 
                                                 
18
 Fisk, In Time of War, 476. 
19
 Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the USA, 1939-1947 (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 
Inc., 1977). 
20
 Ibid., 24. 
 15 
not go to war until the attack on Pearl Harbor.
21
 These Americans shared the deep-rooted 
anti-British feelings of Eire, and as Dublin worked for Irish-American support of 
neutrality, Washington was trying to sway the Irish government and the population at 
large to join the war effort.  Throughout his book, Dwyer articulates the complexities of 
diplomacy and the relationship between the two nations.  
Another major focus of Dwyer‘s study is David Gray and his impact on U.S.-Irish 
and Irish-Allied relations.  Dwyer‘s examination of Gray paints a very negative picture of 
the diplomat, who Dwyer sees as not only misunderstanding de Valera and Ireland‘s 
neutrality but also unreasonably critical. Dwyer argues that Gray probably received his 
appointment only because of his family ties to the President.  As ambassador to Ireland, 
Gray adamantly pushed for the Irish to join the war, or at the very least allow the British 
to use their key ports. Gray saw Irish involvement as critical to the British war effort and 
defeating the Third Reich.  In Dwyer‘s interpretation, Gray‘s views on Irish neutrality 
proved his inadequacies as the U.S. representative to Eire because he could not 
comprehend the Irish perspective and their relationship to Great Britain.  Throughout the 
book Dwyer quotes Gray‘s absurd and unreasonable statements, such as saying, ―thank 
God!,‖ after Pearl Harbor because the United States would finally have the Irish-
American support necessary to formally enter the war.
22
 Many historians who have built 
on this historiography of ―the Emergency,‖ such as John P. Duggan, agree with and cite 
                                                 
21
 Ibid., 45. 
22
 Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the U.S.A., 46. 
 16 
Dwyer‘s interpretations on the unhelpful attributes of the American diplomat. 23  
Nevertheless, Dwyer highlights the key diplomatic relationships of Neutral Eire with the 
United States and the differing opinions, or perhaps misunderstandings, which critics of 
Irish neutrality, including Gray, held.
24
 
Shortly after T. Ryle Dwyer and Robert Fisk‘s political histories, John P. 
Duggan‘s diplomatic history published Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, contributing 
to the historiography by focusing on Ireland‘s relationship with the Third Reich.  The 
principal sources for his work are the official reports of the German Ambassador, Eduard 
Hempel, which had never previously been used.
25
  Duggan gives a very positive portrayal 
of the German minister, whose main task once the war was underway was to keep Ireland 
neutral.  Duggan begins by outlining the background of German-Irish relations, noting 
that Ireland was nothing more than a backwater on the periphery as far as Hitler was 
concerned; however, it came to be relevant after it was clear that Britain was willing to 
go to war with Germany because of Eire‘s close proximity to the United Kingdom.26 
Throughout the war, Duggan highlights key issues that Hempel faced as the 
minister to Ireland during World War II.  Hempel had to attempt to reconcile Berlin‘s 
negative views of de Valera, which were outdated stereotypes dating to the Irish Civil 
War, while pursuing the Fuhrer‘s agenda that could potentially alarm and anger the Irish 
government. For instance, Hitler sought to contact members of the IRA, an illegal 
                                                 
23
  John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, (Gill and Macmillan: Dublin, 
1985). 
24
 Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the USA. 
25
 Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, x. 
26
 Ibid., 7. 
 17 
organization in Ireland, in order to obtain secret information and help sabotage the British 
war efforts. Hempel also relayed the Reich‘s concerns to the Irish government, including 
prisoners of war or German spies, like Herman Goertz, an Abwehr spy who parachuted 
into County Meath in May of 1940.  Overall, Duggan‘s analysis depicts how complicated 
a policy of neutrality can be, especially in interactions with belligerents.  Eire had ―to 
appease British fears, to allay German suspicions and to keep down internal trouble,‖ 
which ―meant that de Valera had to tread warily.‖27 Despite all the complexities, Duggan 
argues that de Valera was successful in his neutrality, and the German Minister along 
with the British Ambassador Maffey helped him to succeed, even if he was more 
sympathetic towards the Allies.  To Duggan, ―in international law the necessary attitude 
(of neutrality) was not incompatible with sympathy for one belligerent and antipathy 
towards another.‖28 
In contrast, Trevor Salmon argues against this interpretation of Eire‘s neutrality in 
his study, Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy, published in 
1989.
29
  Salmon‘s book doesn‘t focus specifically on Ireland during World War Two, but 
it is an important part of the historiography because his argument has been repeatedly 
cited.  Salmon looks at Ireland‘s ―neutral‖ background from the inception of the Irish 
Free State in 1922 until the 1980s, arguing that Ireland has never had a truly ―neutral‖ 
foreign policy. He contends that Ireland has never conformed to the standard rules of 
neutrality by comparing it with other nations such as Switzerland and Austria.  According 
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to Salmon, Ireland continuously fails during critical moments, like the Second World 
War, to act neutral.  In Salmon‘s view, Ireland‘s close relationship with belligerent 
powers, especially Great Britain, made her benevolent towards the Allies, and therefore 
not neutral.  Historians who have written on ―the Emergency‖ after Salmon‘s critique, 
such as Donal O‘Drisceoil, demonstrate his influence through statements like, ―Ireland 
would be more accurately described as ‗non-belligerent,‘ rather than neutral.‖30 
Contradicting Salmon‘s interpretation of Irish neutrality is Jerrold Packard‘s 
study, Neither Friend nor Foe: The European Neutrals in the Second World War.  He 
also takes a comparative approach to show how the five European neutral nations 
(Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, and Ireland) had to act strategically towards the 
belligerents in order to secure their neutrality, something he felt de Valera did 
successfully.  Packard thus places Ireland within the context of other European neutrals. 
He aims to look at how these countries ―reacted to and eventually overcame the 
enormous pressures from the belligerents, what the consequences of their neutrality were, 
how their people lived on the edge of a maelstrom that threatened at any moment to spill 
over their borders.‖31 
 Packard briefly outlines Ireland‘s contentious history with Great Britain and the 
political issues that Ireland faced during the Second World War, while also touching on 
how the war impacted the people within Ireland.   For instance, he emphasizes the main 
issues of partition and American involvement in the war, while also describing the 
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problems with shortages and Irish censorship.
32
  Although Packard examines the common 
issues faced by the European neutrals during the war, on several occasions he notes how 
Ireland was a special case.  Ireland was the only nation that had a substantial risk of being 
invaded by both the Axis and Allies, and where almost the entire population wanted to 
see Hitler defeated in the war, but for multiple reasons they didn‘t feel the need to be 
involved. Where Packard‘s analysis of neutral Ireland differs from the works of Dwyer 
and Duggan is in his skepticism of the overall success of de Valera‘s policies. He views 
Irish neutrality as unforgivable for moral reasons and argues that it kept a barrier of 
distrust between Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Great Britain.
33
 The comparative 
approach of Packard‘s study helps put Ireland and its policies into the larger framework 
of European countries suffering a similar situation during this time of turmoil. 
 Through the early 1990s, the historiography of Ireland during World War II 
retained primarily a diplomatic and political focus.   As more archives and documents 
became available on subjects such as the inner workings of British as well as Irish 
intelligence and military campaigns, historical understandings and interpretations also 
expanded. In the last fifteen years the historiography of Ireland during the war has shifted 
away from an emphasis on international diplomacy towards the social and cultural 
impacts of the war on Ireland.  Historians have more comprehensively examined the 
internal repercussions that the war had on Ireland and its population at large.  For 
instance, historians have begun to assess the significance that censorship had on the Irish 
population.  Censorship was nothing new to the young nation, usually with the goal of 
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portraying a morally wholesome, nationalistic picture of Eire and her history. However, 
with the outbreak of war, the state extended these censorship policies to regulate moral as 
well as political messages in order to maintain the stability of the nation.
34
  
 With Censorship in Ireland 1939-1945: Neutrality, Politics, and Society, Donal 
O‘Drisceoil became the first historian to analyze Ireland‘s extensive censorship policies 
and how they influenced Ireland‘s political culture and emotional climate during the 
war.
35
 From the Irish Free State‘s inception, ―censorship became an important 
mechanism of control…a measure designated, in its various manifestations, to maintain 
the security of the states and protect the (narrowly defined) morals and culture of the 
nation.‖36  Donal O‘Drisceoil outlines the background of Ireland‘s extensive censorship 
prior to the war and then analyzes their strict policy by each genre, such as film, 
newspapers, and literature.  He places these policies within the broader context of the 
Second World War.  O‘Drisceoil agrees with almost all other historians that neutrality 
was Ireland‘s most practical option, for reasons related to Anglo-Irish relations as well as 
the fact that they could not defend themselves militarily.  However, he adds a new spin to 
the historiography by arguing that censorship was the ―backbone‖ to Ireland‘s neutrality. 
Censorship worked as an internal security measure, and it was crucial for the Irish 
government in order to keep the public supportive of neutrality and prevent belligerents 
from an excuse to invade.
37
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By dividing his chapters by genre, the thoroughness of Irish censorship and the 
key actors involved under the Emergency Powers Act of 1939 becomes clear.
38
 This 
legislation allowed the Irish government to maintain neutrality by giving them more 
authority, including control over the Irish economy and censorship.  When looking at 
film and censorship, he uses examples such as the government banning Charlie Chaplin‘s 
film, ―The Great Dictator‖ (1940), because Chaplin pokes fun at Adolf Hitler and his 
oppressive policies.  If this perspective of Hitler was shown, it could have ―meant riots 
and bloodshed‖ throughout the country according to Frank Aiken, the Minister of Co-
ordination of Defensive Measures.
 39
 The banning of this film is just one of the ironies 
that O‘Drisceoil constantly refers to. The Irish were careful to censor anything that might 
be interpreted as biased towards the Allies or the Axis powers, while in reality the 
government was clearly in favor of the Allies.
40
  He concludes by illuminating the 
impacts that the censors had and how the media and public responded after the war when 
censors were lifted. For instance, Irish packed cinemas where previously banned 
newsreels were playing or the Irish Times editor‘s, R.M. Smyllie, printed an article, 
―They Can Be Published Now,‖ with graphic details and images of the war.41 One of the 
negative consequences of Eire‘s censorship was that the images and incidences from 
places like Katyn, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki were difficult for the Irish public to 
digest and accept after enduring the war innocently ignorant of its major atrocities.
42
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Although the Irish public was aware of the war, and felt at least some of its repercussions, 
many historians emphasize Ireland‘s real isolation from the war, like Dublin‘s ―bright 
lights‖ compared to the blackouts in Northern Ireland and Britain.43 
Building on the work of Donal O‘Drisceoil, Robert Cole‘s book, Propaganda, 
Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War, extended the scope of 
historical research on Irish censorship by focusing on the international elements of 
propaganda within Ireland and the functions of the censors during the ―Emergency.‖  
Cole‘s study also added a new perspective by placing it within the context of expanding 
mass communications in this era and the governmental powers of persuasion. Cole 
focuses on the key initiators behind the propaganda machines of the belligerents, 
especially Great Britain and the United States. Both the Allies and the Axis had 
organized propaganda regimens within Ireland to promote their interests in the war, while 
Irish censors and their own government-initiated propaganda labored to portray unbiased 
accounts and keep the public in support of neutrality. According to Cole, the United 
States and Great Britain made larger efforts to sway Irish opinion because they had a 
much greater interest in changing Irish opinion, whereas Germany realized their best 
hope was keeping Ireland neutral.
44
   
 In this analysis, Cole focuses on the main actors, such as the British Ministry of 
Information and the American Office of War Information, and how they attempted to 
shift Irish opinion against neutrality.  He looks at various elements outside of Ireland that 
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played into the international propaganda efforts, including the important opinion of the 
Irish-American population who supported Irish neutrality until Pearl Harbor and voiced 
their opinions through various newspapers such as the Gaelic American.
45
  Some of the 
most prominent channels of influence that the Allies had in Ireland were through British 
radio broadcasts as well as the illegal distribution of leaflets. Through this extensive 
research on propaganda networks in Ireland, Cole is able to conclude that de Valera and 
Eire‘s censorship ―won the war of words.‖46  Nonetheless, he argues that the Allies didn‘t 
lose because the Irish government was very helpful in relaying information to the United 
States and Britain, and hundreds of thousands Irishmen still helped the Allied war effort, 
either through working at munitions factories in Britain or even volunteering for the 
British military.
47
   
 Moving away from the propaganda machines of Eire and the Allies, Eunan 
O‘Halpin researches the intelligence networks of the British within Ireland.  His book, 
Spying on Ireland: British Intelligence and Irish Neutrality During the Second World 
War, was not possible until very recently, when highly confidential sources became 
available for historical scholarship in the British National Archives, such as documents 
pertaining to the Security Service (MI5) or the Records of Special Operations Executive 
(SOE). O‘Halpin‘s study examines ―British dealings with Ireland in the wider context of 
the challenges facing British intelligence,‖ as well as comparing it to Allied relations with 
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other neutral nations.
48
  Interestingly, O‘Halpin points out that the British had very little 
knowledge on Ireland, there having been an absence of British diplomatic presence since 
the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922.
49
    
Throughout the book, O‘Halpin effectively articulates the changes and 
developments in British Irish intelligence as the war progressed and concerns were 
altered.  During the ―phony war‖ of 1939-1940, Irish neutrality was more of an irritant 
than a real problem, but once Germany took over nations like France and Norway, 
Ireland was seen as a mortal security threat for Great Britain.  Germany have could easily 
defeat Ireland militarily, placing them only a step away from the England.
50
  The tensest 
times for Allied intelligence was with a heavy presence of American troops in Ulster and 
the effort to preserve secrecy leading up to Operation Overlord. Other historians have 
emphasized this issue when covering the ―American Note‖ (the U.S. demand that Eire 
expel the German and Japanese delegations from Dublin), but O‘Halpin explains it from 
a British intelligence perspective.  However, as unnerving as neutral Eire was to Great 
Britain throughout the war, O‘Halpin shows how they became extremely useful for 
relaying information to the Allies. O‘Halpin concludes that, ―intelligence activities 
concerning Ireland during the Second World War belong to different points on a 
spectrum running from what became an almost full alliance…to aggressive black 
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propaganda against Irish neutrality.‖51 Ultimately, the cooperation between Dublin, 
London, and Belfast was a necessary cornerstone in the Allied war effort.  
Distinguishing herself from other historians who have studied Ireland and the 
Second World War, Clair Wills examines the Irish cultural experience during the war in 
That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland during the Second World War.  Wills 
utilizes works from the community of poets, playwrights, writers, and dramatists 
throughout her book and shows how their works represent the larger sentiments of the 
Irish during World War II and their overall benevolence towards the Allies.
52
  The 
common view on Ireland is that it was an isolated place during the war, but her argument 
shows how the war touched the majority of the Irish people.  Wills points out that the 
Irish were involved through ―volunteering, migrant work, spying, smuggling, 
unemployment, shortages, censorship, defence:  there was no home front in Ireland, but 
the country was nonetheless shaped by war.‖53  
She begins her study by outlining the major issues affecting Irish society at large, 
specifically its dilemma between modernization and Eire‘s traditional lifestyles along 
with its bitter sentiments towards the British.  Each chapter recognizes a major issue that 
Ireland faced during the war and dissects the public‘s reactions to it.  For instance, 
Chapter 6, ―War in the Air,‖ overviews the air raids of the Luftwaffe and the impacts they 
had on the British Isles.  Wills shows how contemporary literature represented the Irish 
role in this during the war, like Vincent Carroll‘s play, ―The Strings are False:  A Drama 
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of Clydeside Air Raids.‖ This play emphasizes the humanitarian concerns of the Irish fire 
brigades in their response to bombings in Belfast.
54
  Apart from the depictions in popular 
culture, Wills cites an abundance of various Irish men and women‘s experiences, 
detailing how the Irish were in direct contact with the wartime brutalities: from the 
dozens of accounts reminiscing about bodies that washed up on the west coast of Ireland 
during the Battle of the Atlantic to the presence of British and American troops on leave 
in Eire.
55
 
Although one consequence of Ireland‘s neutrality was the expansion of local 
theatres and cultural organizations, That Neutral Island concludes with a discussion on 
―paying for neutrality.‖  Wills outlines many of the negative consequences of Ireland‘s 
neutrality. The war stimulated the ―vanished generation‖: young people leaving Ireland 
for better economies and livelihoods in places like Britain, something that has been a 
concern of the Irish since before independence.
56
  Ireland was condemned by the Allies 
for not contributing, de Valera was ridiculed for paying condolences to the German 
minister after Hitler‘s death, and there was an overall distrust throughout the Irish 
population of the horrific images of the war that were suddenly shown, a repercussion of 
censorship that has been noted by historians such as Cole and O‘ Driscioel.57  Ultimately, 
Clair Wills cultural study combined with the historical studies of Irish politics, 
intelligence, or censorship, shed light on the overarching themes of the Irish wartime 
experience.   
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From these historians‘ analysis one can see how the war impacted Eire and her 
people, yet Richard Doherty‘s multiple studies even further this historical understanding 
of Ireland during the Second World War by exploring the Irish who joined the British 
military.  While Irish involvement in the Allied forces during the Second World War was 
briefly acknowledged by almost all of the historians discussed here, Doherty highlights 
how prevalent and significant the Irish were in the Allied war effort.  Whether it was the 
Irish men and women working in munitions factories in England or the Irish generals in 
command during the Second World War, Doherty argues that the Irish played a very 
prominent role.  He has written several books regarding the Irish and the Second World 
War, many of which build upon each other, including:  Clear the Way! A History of the 
38
th
 Brigade (1993), Irish Men and Women in the Second World War (1999), Irish 
Volunteers in the Second World War (2002), Ireland’s Generals in the Second World 
War (2004), and In the Ranks of Death: The Irish in the Second World War (2010).
58
  
Doherty is primarily a military historian, and these works delve into the roles that 
Irishmen played throughout World War Two.  He looks at the Irish experience as military 
commanders, as soldiers in key battles, as well as soldiers fighting in the air, at sea, on 
land, and even Irish immigrant workers in Great Britain. The number of Irish men and 
women who served with the British forces during World War II fluctuate between 
various Irish estimates, British estimates, and official documents.  According to 
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Doherty‘s calculations, over 110,000 Irishmen enlisted in British forces, with more per 
capita joining from the southern, neutral twenty-six counties than from Northern 
Ireland.
59
 However, reaching a decisive number is extremely difficult.  Many southern 
Irishmen fled to Belfast or across the Irish Sea to enlist in England, lying about their 
origins, whereas others were already a part of the British military or already living in 
Great Britain when they signed up.  Although the actual number may vary, what is 
undeniable from Doherty‘s account is that a very large number of Irishmen joined and 
fought for the British forces during the war.  
In his studies, Ireland’s Generals in the Second World War and Clear the Way! A 
History of the 38
th
 Brigade, Doherty gives a precise military history of specific Irishmen 
involved, whether it is an account of the Irish generals‘ experiences in the Second World 
War or a battle-by-battle description of the Irish brigade and their exploits.  However, in 
his other works regarding Ireland and World War Two, such as Irish Men and Women in 
the Second World War or In the Ranks of Death, he tries to understand why these 
Irishmen joined, their accomplishments, and their significance. He looks at a wide variety 
of Irish who served, using personal interviews, diaries, memoirs, and letters as sources.  
Doherty analyzes the roles that these Irish played, from chaplains or doctors to airmen 
and infantry.  Historians have speculated why the Irish would join the British forces, with 
many concluding that Irishmen joined for monetary reasons or family traditions, but 
Doherty strongly argues in works such as In the Ranks of Death that these Irishmen 
fought for what they believed in, whether it be democracy or freedom, and that they 
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deserve to be remembered and acknowledged for their heroism.  Many of the Irish that 
fought for the British were either forgotten or ostracized after the war, especially those 
that deserted the Irish Army because it was not their war to fight.  Doherty alongside 
recent efforts with the University College Cork‘s Volunteers Project aims to keep their 
memories alive and give them credit they deserve for fighting in the War.
60
   
With Doherty‘s military histories on Irish volunteers, O‘Halpin‘s intricate study 
of British Irish intelligence, and Wills‘ cultural history of the Irish experience during this 
time, one can see how far the historiography on wartime Eire has expanded in recent 
decades.  As more documents and archives have become available, historical 
understanding on Neutral Ireland and life on the ―edge‖ of global conflict has also 
broadened.  Until Donal O‘Drisceoil‘s Censorship in Ireland, the historical writing on 
Ireland throughout the Second World War focused on a political narrative. The books 
written by Dwyer, Fisk, Duggan, and Packard analyzed the major interactions and 
concerns that the Irish government under Eamon de Valera dealt with, and allowed for 
historians like Clair Wills to place her cultural understanding within this broader 
historical interpretation.  Almost all of these historians have built off of one another, each 
adding new understandings to ―the Emergency.‖   
After looking at the historical scholarship on Eire, the portrait that emerges is one 
of very complex relations and interactions between Eire, her people, and the European 
theatre of war. Politically, neutrality was the only option for de Valera and his 
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government, however, like the population at large, his policies favored the Allied powers 
of Great Britain and the United States. Eire remained neutral throughout the war because 
of historical memory of the conflict with Great Britain and the fact that in doing so 
cemented Irish sovereignty. Even in remaining neutral, the war was at the forefront of 
governmental policy, both domestically and internationally.  Under de Valera, the Irish 
government pursued programs such as harsh censorship throughout the country and 
rationing due to limited resources as an island nation surrounded by war.  
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the Irish nation remained on the edge of this 
conflict. Yes, the war dominated Irish politics of the time, but Ireland was only a concern 
to belligerent powers depending on the wartime events outside of Eire.  And even though 
Irish men and women joined the British cause, the majority of the Irish remained within 
the neutral borders of Eire. When looking at the consequences of the neutrality or the 
culture, censorship, and politics during the war, the Irish people were removed from the 
global catastrophe. Most of these historians, such as Jerrold Packard or Donal 
O‘Drisceoil maintain that in the aftermath of the war, it was difficult for the Irish to relate 
to or even comprehend the traumatic events that occurred in the world around them.  By 
remaining neutral, Ireland did not experience or witnessed the devastating brutalities of 
the Second World War. Instead, they experienced the milder repercussions of war, such 
as limited resources, rationing, or encounters with various victims who arrived in Eire 
from the battles in the air and at sea. Unlike the rest Europe, Ireland did not undergo 
blackouts, experience extensive bombing, or have tens of thousands her people killed or 
injured as a result of the conflict.  Ultimately, it is clear that the Irish government and 
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people were sympathetic towards the Allies, however they did not want to and were not 
fully involved in the war.  
The blossoming historiography has allowed for this depiction of Ireland and the 
Second World War to evolve; however, many areas of Eire and the Irish experiences on 
the edge of world conflict remain untouched.   One aspect that no historian has given a 
primary focus to is how American journalists and newspapers covered Irish neutrality 
during the war.  Almost all historians will note the breadth and significance that Irish 
censorships on the media within Ireland, seen in the works of O‘Drisceol and Wills, but 
they do not delve into how other nations portrayed the Irish in the war.  For Americans, 
their perspectives on Ireland‘s neutral policies changed significantly as the war evolved 
and the United States formally joined the Allied cause.  Once the United States was at 
war with Germany, Irish Americans along with the rest of the American population could 
be more critical of other nations who were not participating in the Allied war effort.  
Major U.S. newspapers, such as The New York Times or The Washington Post, reflect the 
shifting opinions that Americans had towards Eire from the beginning of the war until the 
defeat of Japan.  
In addition to American newspaper coverage on Eire, for American war 
correspondents and journalists placed within the war zone, it is understandable how their 
assessments on Irish neutrality grew more critical and less understanding with time.  The 
outlooks of Americans living in Great Britain during the Blitz in 1940 reflected their 
 32 
environment and affected their reporting on Ireland.
 61
  However, no historian has 
explored how American reporters who ―stood with Britain‖ viewed and reported on 
Ireland.    
Because this historiography has yet to explore the coverage that American 
newspapers, war correspondents, and journalists gave Ireland throughout the war, the 
following chapters will do so in comparison with the issue of how the Irish themselves 
perceived the war and their role in it. Examining the Irish experiences during the war 
alongside the experiences of American journalists and their reporting will enrich the 
historiography with new perspectives on Irish neutrality.  Ultimately, the Irish and the 
American correspondents did agree upon one thing:  Ireland could not erase the 
memories and myths of past centuries under British rule.  For six years, Ireland benefited 
in one way or another from the war and the Irish supported their nations‘ policy, even if it 
was a ―selfish‖ decision because they did not have to experience the devastation of the 
war and maintained their sovereignty. Nevertheless, critics of neutrality had a point; 
Eire‘s fate was wrapped up with Great Britain, if Hitler defeated Britain he would not 
hesitate to take over Eire, and in times like the Second World War, century-old memories 
should be set aside.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
IN AND OUT OF THE WAR: THE IRISH PERSPECTIVE 
 ON WORLD WAR II 
 
Yet from the events of those years, certain conclusions can 
be drawn about the priorities and self-interest of nations at 
a time of war…about the principles underlying a policy of 
neutrality 
- Robert Fisk, In Time of War62 
 
The Second World War transformed Irish society, whether fighting abroad or 
living in Dublin, which became a ―city of cyclists‖ thanks to wartime shortages.63  The 
war cemented the political independence of the new nation and touched all Irish men and 
women, in some way or another.  It marked the first time the Irish military attracted men 
who supported both sides of the Civil War, while Dublin was seen as a vibrant city with a 
humming social life, and this small neutral nation hosted many Allied soldiers on leave.  
Furthermore, tens of thousands of Irishmen, from both North and South, volunteered to 
join the British forces during the war, exemplifying the fact that Ireland‘s neutrality was 
benevolent towards the Allies.  Emotionally and even physically, the majority of Irish 
people wanted Britain to win the war; however, joining the Allied cause was a step too 
far.  Almost the entire Irish nation supported Taoiseach Eamon de Valera‘s policy of 
neutrality, and Eire was able to endure the war with minimal damage compared to other 
belligerent nations. Nevertheless, Irish neutrality had many critics, especially from the 
Allied nations of Great Britain and the United States.   
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Because the subsequent chapters will explore critics of Irish neutrality (American 
war correspondents coming from London and coverage given by U.S. newspapers) this 
chapter looks at the experiences of Irish men and women both living in Eire and fighting 
abroad in order to further understand the contours of Irish neutrality. It is important, first 
because it illuminates why Eire and her people pursued and supported a policy of 
neutrality and secondly because it places the criticisms of Irish neutrality into the context 
of the larger Irish experience, showing why these condemnations were never widespread 
enough amongst the Irish to override neutrality.  These varying perspectives on Irish 
neutrality are closely related to the surroundings and experiences of those involved, 
whether living in Eire and constantly hearing of the past atrocities of the British or 
reporting on Eire‘s position after experiencing the harsh realities of the London Blitz. 
This chapter explores the first of these differing perspectives, but it also adds to the 
historiography by looking at the experiences of Irish men and women within Eire as well 
as the Irish who volunteered for the British army, highlighting the relationship Eire had 
with Great Britain during the war and why these volunteers reflect the larger position that 
the Irish Free State had towards the war. Whereas previous historians such as Richard 
Doherty explored the involvement of Irish men and women towards the British cause, 
giving more of a play-by-play account of Irish actions during the war, this chapter 
analyzes the overall Irish experience in the military and how they related to one another 
as well as to the British military as a whole.
64
  In doing so, one can further see why Irish 
neutrality worked for Eamon de Valera and the Irish people.  
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Exploring memoirs, diaries, and recollections of Irishmen during the war, 
alongside the interviews undertaken by Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, it is evident that 
many Irish benefited from the neutral policy and that their neutrality was in favor of the 
Allies.
65
 Grob-Fitzgibbon, in an effort to further the historical understanding of the Irish 
experience during the Second World War and to create a valuable source for future 
historians, interviewed seventeen Irish men and women who lived during the Second 
World War, from those who fought with the British military to those that lived in Dublin 
for the duration of the war.  This chapter will utilize these interviews in Grob-
Fitzgibbon‘s oral history while also exploring other memoirs by Irishmen whom lived in 
Eire or fought in the British military, such as Sam McAughtry or Aidan MacCarthy.
66
 All 
of these stories are by no means representative of the entire population, and many of the 
interviews, memoirs, and recollections were written decades after their experiences in the 
war or with neutrality. However, what they do is show a glimpse of what life what like 
for the Irish during this time, in and outside of Eire—showing the complex relationship 
that Eire has had towards the United Kingdom, with the interactions of Irish between the 
neutral South and belligerent North as well as with the Irish as part of the British war 
effort. Ultimately, these interviews and memoirs support the interpretation of Irish 
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neutrality agreed upon by all the historians in the previous chapter—that it was 
benevolent towards the Allies—while also showing why Irishmen, even those fighting 
abroad, refrained from criticizing Irish neutrality alongside the American war 
correspondents and U.S. newspapers who did. 
 So why did Ireland pursue a policy of neutrality during World War Two, a time 
when Europe‘s fate hung on the edge of sword?  In a speech given by Eamon de Valera 
in December of 1941, he reaffirmed the belief that Ireland had no choice except neutrality 
because, ―our circumstances and history and the incompleteness of our national freedom 
through the partition of our country made any other policy impracticable.‖67  If Ireland 
allied with Great Britain, not only would it have meant accepting partition, but as 
Irishmen admit themselves, it would have obscured and discredited their recently won 
freedom from Great Britain.  As Tom Ryan, a student in Dublin during the war, stated, 
―the state was only formed in 1922, so we only had seventeen years of freedom from our 
long troubles with England. So, I don‘t think people would have liked us to join with 
England in anything.‖68 Not only that, but as seen with studies such as Clair Wills‘ 
discussion on the ―mobilization‖ of Eire‘s defenses or Robert Fisk‘s discussion to the end 
of partition, Ireland had a very weak military, making an invasion by a powerful force 
almost impossible to stave off.
69
  Just as important, de Valera‘s policy was ―supported by 
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the majority‖ of the population, an impressive feat for such a historically divided 
nation.
70
  
Beyond these practicalities that favored neutrality, much of the Irish population 
benefited from the neutral stance compared to places in the United Kingdom that were 
under the constant threat of Luftwaffe raids, such as London or other British cities as 
Dover.  For instance, Dublin was an attractive city to visit and live in throughout the war. 
Not only did it have better selections of food to those that could afford it, but Ireland 
offered a lively social scene as well as a vibrant cultural blossoming, as detailed by Clair 
Wills in That Neutral Island and supported by the Irish men and women looked at here.
71
 
The ―social life went on,‖ and from the separate interviews of Patrick Scott, Patrick 
Lynch, Maureen Disken, and Laim O‘Reagan, the entertainment was very good during 
their war. There were bars, dances, comedians and plays to attend. According to Tony 
Gray‘s recollections of living in Dublin during the war, ―another attraction Ireland 
offered at this period was a very active literary and theatrical scene.‖72  Gray paints a 
very positive portrayal of Irish neutrality, even though he himself was a journalist for the 
Irish Times under R. M. Smyllie and encountered on a regular basis the ―blue pencil‖ or 
heavy wartime censorship policies.
73
 Looking back on Eire during the war, Gray 
reminisces fondly on the cultural and literary movements, such as a formation of the 
―White Stag,‖ an artistic group that met in Dublin throughout the war under the direction 
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of Smyllie. Ultimately, Gray argues that neutrality was beneficial to Ireland because the 
Irish had to rely more upon each other and Eire‘s resources, such as turf.  
As seen with the previous chapter, there were also negative consequences of Irish 
neutrality, however the benefits, such as the social life or even the cultural scene as 
described by Tony Gray or Patrick Scott, made Dublin a very appealing city to visitors 
who could get there. Although American journalists, such as Ben Robertson or Quentin 
Reynolds, constantly remarked on the all the ―red tape‖ they had to go through in order to 
visit Eire from England, many Allied soldiers came down to Eire while on leave. As 
Patrick Scott notes, ―when they [Americans] came into the war and they were stationed, 
hoards of them, in Derry and generally in the North. They used to come flooding down 
on the weekends for steaks.‖74 Eire remained neutral, yet the Irish as well as Allied 
soldiers or journalists made their way between the belligerent North and the neutral 
South. For many it was to enjoy the benefits of Eire‘s wartime policy, whether it was the 
lights of Dublin or the food that those with money could purchase. However, Irishmen 
also ventured to the North. As will be explored further, thousands of southern Irishmen 
went through Belfast to enlist in the British military but also the neutral government of 
Eire sent fire brigades to Belfast after they were brutally bombed by the German 
Luftwaffe in May 1941.
75
  
From these images of wartime Dublin, a place with a humming social life and an 
attraction for Allied servicemen, compared to the blackouts and extensive bombings of 
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cities throughout the United Kingdom, Ireland‘s neutrality seems only logical. Why 
wouldn‘t the Irish government and Irish people avoid the brutalities of war by pursuing a 
neutral policy? Even beyond these visual benefits of Eire‘s neutrality alongside issues of 
national sovereignty and their tumultuous history with Great Britain, the war brought the 
Irish population together under the policy of neutrality. Even the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) had trouble finding support throughout the southern twenty-six counties. 
  At the beginning of the War, the IRA made an attack against the Irish Army, 
known as the Magazine Fort Raid or the ―Christmas Raid.‖  On December 23, 1939 
members of the IRA raided the Irish Army‘s ammunition depot in Phoenix Park, Dublin 
following the passing of the Emergency Powers Act, which stipulated the policies that the 
Irish government would pursue throughout the course of the war.  However, following 
this attack, the Irish government cracked down on the IRA and the organization lost 
momentum and support throughout the country until after the war years.  In fact, with the 
help of many civilians the Irish military eventually recovered nearly all of what was 
stolen. According to Irish Army Commandant Owen Quinn, who served during the war, 
the raid ―turned the people wholesale against them.‖76  The IRA had been officially 
outlawed after the Civil War of 1922-23; however, they continued to garner support from 
a significant section of the Irish population, even with their violent attacks against the 
Irish government, Northern Ireland, and Great Britain.   
 The lack of support for the IRA during ―the Emergency‖ displays one way in 
which the Irish population was united under its government‘s policies.  Not only has the 
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historiography put IRA activity during the war on the backburner, but also even Uniseann 
Maceoin, a member of the IRA who was detained at the Curragh throughout the war for 
being involved in this illegal organization, admits its diminishing significance.  After the 
raid, ―the IRA‘s morale was dashed completely by what had happened… in Curragh and 
among the prisoners who were released there was no talk about reforming or going back 
at all. It was thought that the IRA was pretty well finished.‖77 There were a few IRA 
prisoners who went on hunger strike during the war, like Jack McNeela or Tony D‘Arcy, 
and the government allowed them to die without upsetting the population at large.  For 
the most part, the IRA‘s World War II experience reflects the very small pro-German 
portion of Irish society.  From Irish recollections of ―the Emergency,‖ like Sean Clancy 
or Patrick Lynch, ―the IRA didn‘t count that much,‖ or ―their numbers during the war 
were very, very small…I have no real recollections whatsoever of IRA activity.‖78  
 Beyond being unsupportive of contentious activities against the government, the 
population within Ireland during the war came together under the common cause of 
defense.  After Dunkirk and the German invasion of Norway, a potential attack on Ireland 
became a very realistic fear.  The Irish military was small and poorly equipped, however 
they did recruit and prepare for warfare during ―the Emergency.‖  This Irish Army went 
from standing at 7,600 (with 19,000 on full mobilization) to almost doubling its size 
within the first five weeks of their recruitment campaign in early 1940.
79
  Not only did 
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thousands join the Irish Army, but also even more volunteered for the Local Defense 
Force (LDF), with thousands more on reserve.   
The defense of Ireland prepared for a possible invasion from both Great Britain 
and Germany, even though most people feared that they would be invaded by Germany.  
In 1938 Great Britain had relinquished their hold on key Irish ports: Berehaven, Lough 
Swilly, and Cobh. When war broke out, the Allies saw these ports as vital components to 
winning the war at sea, however if Ireland allowed the British to use these ports, it would 
be impossible for them to remain neutral.  As Robert Fisk writes, Great Britain even 
suggested the end to partition in June of 1940 if Ireland would join the war and allow 
them to usage of the ports.
80
  However, de Valera understood the political realities to the 
end of partition and remained committed to neutrality, cementing their sovereignty and 
perhaps even partition itself.  Nevertheless, Ireland reached an agreement with Britain 
that if Germany invaded, which seemed imminent on several occasions, the British 
military could then enter the nation to help defend it.  
The Irish prepared for invasions in multiple ways, such as by removing all 
signposts throughout the island, making it more difficult for a potential invader to 
navigate.  Although they trained and took various measures against an attack, Irish 
veterans understood that their prospects were dismal in the face of assault from military 
machines of Adolf Hitler. ―We were all conscious that we wouldn‘t have lasted long in 
open warfare, but we were convinced that we would have reverted to guerilla warfare 
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when our machine did break down,‖ according to Brigadier General Patrick Hogan. 81 
Other Irish Army veterans interviewed by Grob-Fitzgibbon (Brigadier General Patrick 
Hogan, Brigadier General Patrick Daly, Lieutenant Colonel James Coyle, Lieutenant 
Colonel John P. Duggan, and Commandant Owen Quinn) expressed similar opinions.
82
 
These accounts, alongside Clair Wills examination regarding the build-up of Irish defense 
forces, show that many people throughout Eire understood the likelihood of an invasion, 
however, their military strength remained dismal even after they mobilized.
83
  
Not only would Irish defenses have proven weak in the event of an invasion, but 
also many who were a part of the Army remember it as ― a bit of a light hearted affair.‖84  
In fact, John Keyes Byrne gives a more satirical take on Irish defenses in his memoir 
describing his Dublin childhood, Home Before Night.
85
 He was a young teenager during 
the war and joined the Local Defense Force, describing his unit as a ―lethargic group‖ 
who never finished training because new recruits kept joining and they would spend their 
time acting out scenarios of a potential invasion of Dublin.
86
 Even though he left the LDF 
without saying a word, nobody came looking for him, and he later joined the Local 
Security Force in which, all he remembered from it was, ―learning to operate a stirrup 
pump,‖ his disbandment dinner, and ―being detailed to patrol the back roads from 
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midnight until four a.m., in the company of a man named Devaney.‖87  These 
recollections support the notion that Ireland‘s weak military was yet another valid reason 
not to join the war.  
The defenses of Eire may have been embarrassingly weak, but the make-up of the 
Irish Army alone during this era alone shows how the Irish nation came together more 
than ever before in its short, independent history.  For the first time since the twenty-six 
southern counties were granted independence from Great Britain, Irish men and women 
from both sides of the Civil War were united within the framework of the Irish Army.  
When asked why the Army had such an inactive place in Irish society before the war, 
Patrick Hogan explains its transformation stating: 
First of all, it had been representative of only one side in the civil war. The civil 
war was over fifteen or sixteen years before I joined but still the leaders of the 
army and everyone above the rank of lieutenant in it had fought in the civil war, 
and on one side in the civil war. So, there was that which made it a little tighter 
than if it had been representative of the whole country. At that stage it was not 
representative at all. It became so as soon as the war broke out. Very quickly it 
became representative of the whole country, entered into the social stream, and 
was very much part of the life.
88
 
 
Even if many people who enlisted, like John P. Duggan, did so primarily for a job, they 
were able to ―bury the hatchet‖ on the issues surrounding the Civil War.  Perhaps more 
important than the Irish military‘s expansion and preparations during this time, is how 
military service unified divided Irishmen.  
 The most significant aspect of Ireland‘s military that these sources illuminate, is 
that a significant portion of the Irish were united under de Valera‘s policy of neutrality; 
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yet, at the same time both the population and the government favored Allies. Irish Army 
veterans even stated that almost everybody within its ranks wanted the Allies to win, 
even the senior officers who fought against them in 1920-21.
89
  And for those that 
weren‘t pro-British, they just wanted ―to give the British a bloody nose, rather than a 
victory for the Germans.‖90 Even American newspapers reported that the majority of Irish 
preferred a British victory, but at the same time many Irish would also like to see them 
―almost licked.‖91 The Irish and British had a closely intertwined relationship to one 
another, no matter how much either would like to admit it.  So much so, that it was still 
legal for Irishmen to join the British Army. Ireland has historically been a large recruiting 
ground for the British military, and ―at no point during the war did the Irish government 
seriously consider putting a stop to the voluntary recruitment of Irish men and women in 
the British forces.‖92  The fact that tens of thousands of Irishmen risked their lives by 
voluntarily fighting in British uniforms during the war explicitly signifies that a large 
portion of the Irish population favored the Allies.
93
  
 From the memories and recollections of Irish men and women throughout their 
wartime experiences, almost everybody knew of Irish men or women serving with the 
British military, or at the very least working in the armament factories over in Great 
Britain. Dublin resident Maureen Diskin, a Dublin resident, father worked in a munitions 
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factory and her boyfriend was shot down over Dunkirk while serving in the RAF (Royal 
Air Force), John P. Duggan commented: ―the pride all of us took here, that we got seven 
Victoria Crosses in the war and Canada only got some smaller number, and we were 
supposed to be neutral.‖94 According to estimates by Richard Doherty, 110,000 Irishmen 
from both Northern and Southern Ireland enlisted, with more per capita coming out of the 
twenty-six technically neutral counties. Furthermore, roughly 7,000 Irish deserted the 
Irish Army in order to join the British.
95
  In an oral interview of a group of veterans, 
when John P. Duggan stated that, ―I‘m sure all of you had the experience of fellows 
deserting our army to go to the British,‖ the veterans agreed this was a common 
experience.
96
  
 This large segment of Irish joining the British military, and even deserting the 
Irish, might seem contradictory to the notion that Irish men and women were united 
under the policy of neutrality, but in fact, it illustrates how most Irish supported a British 
victory even though the nation as a whole never joined the war effort. From the sources 
of Irish men and women viewed here, they all knew friends, family, acquaintances that 
served with the British, and at least for some, when it came to tension between those that 
joined and those that didn‘t, they ―never encountered any.‖97   
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Of course, after the war ended many these soldiers didn‘t receive a hero‘s 
welcome, and some were more or less forgotten or isolated.  Major James F. Hickie even 
stated that, ―you were regarded as being slightly less than Irish, having been in British 
service.‖98  When he was asked why, he opined that those who joined the Irish army felt 
like they ―missed out‖ on the adventures of war, even though they didn‘t admit it.99  
Significantly, the most negative sentiments occurred only after the war, according to 
these accounts.  Perhaps this reflects that the anxieties and hype that evolved out of the 
wartime atmosphere were temporary, seen with the unification of Irishmen from both 
sides of the Civil War under the policy of neutrality or the underlying support for Great 
Britain‘s and the Allies war efforts.  For the thousands of Irishmen who joined the war, 
they not only represent the ―incestuous relationship between the two islands,‖ but also 
show that the Irish population was largely supportive of the British war effort.
100
 
Why these soldiers deserted or joined the British military is debatable, whether it 
was for better pay, family tradition in the British military, adventure, or simply because 
they believed in the cause.  Throughout these memoirs, diaries, or interviews of the 
Irishmen that joined the British military, it is clear most of them related to one another, 
whether they were Protestant, Catholic, from Northern Ireland, or from Southern Ireland.  
Like the members of the Irish Army, these men and women from throughout Ireland were 
united by the fact that they not only were from the Emerald Isle, but also because they 
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were fighting under the British crown.  These few sources are by no mean representative 
of the tens of thousands of Irishmen who fought for Britain, but they at least show the 
interconnectedness that Irishmen had towards one another in the British forces as well as 
that on the individual level, Irish neutrality was much more complicated than just staying 
out of the war.   
These memoirs and recollections of wartime experiences suggest that the Irish 
formed a distinct group in the British military. For instance, as soon as a fellow British 
soldier heard an Irish accent, they were referred to as ―Paddy,‖ regardless of the fact that 
many were technically from the United Kingdom as well.
101
 Furthermore, these Irish 
volunteers display a sense of camaraderie, whether they were from the North or South. 
Throughout Sam McAugthry‘s memoir of his wartime experience, McAughtry’s War, he, 
a Protestant from Belfast, never fails to comment on meeting an Irishman, buying him 
beers, or reminiscing of home.
102
 His experiences display a type of brotherhood between 
Irishmen in the British forces. For example, an officer, who was from the North Wall in 
Dublin, did not lash out at him for having an improper shaving kit because he heard his 
accent.
103
 Ray Davey, a Presbyterian from Belfast, also emphasizes the companionship 
between Irishmen, in his diary of the war, writing: ―met a chap from Sandy Row who 
treated me like a long-lost friend. I was given a present of Italian cigars.‖104 Davey‘s 
diary chronicles his day-by-day experiences with the war, yet he has nothing but positive 
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entries on his run-ins with fellow Irishmen, both northern and southern. McAughtry even 
states that he ―remembers Padgate [where he trained] for discovering my Irishness.‖105 
Even though McAughtry might embellish the realities of serving with the British Army, 
especially because later in life he protested the sectarian violence between the factions in 
Ireland, his memories alongside others such as Ray Davey can at least shed light on the 
interactions of Irishmen serving with the British. Not only were they constantly referred 
to as ―Paddy‖ and stereotyped on the basis of accent alone, but on one occasion 
McAughtry was even asked if his heart was in the war, specifically because of his Irish 
heritage.
106
 
Beyond the connections that Irish serving abroad felt towards one another, none 
of them criticize or even call into question Irish neutrality. These Irishmen experienced 
firsthand the brutalities of the war, just as the American correspondents discussed in the 
next chapter did; however unlike the U.S. journalists, they did not criticize Ireland‘s 
neutral stance. Even Aidan MacCarthy, an Irish-Catholic from Berehaven in West Cork, 
never questions or criticizes de Valera‘s policy. This is shocking especially after his 
experience as a prisoner of war at the mercy of the Japanese. MacCarthy personally faced 
the atrocities and crimes against humanity that occurred during the Second World War, 
being beaten on one occasion simply for having a southern Irish address (meaning he 
volunteered to fight against the Empire of Japan). Yet, MacCarthy still refrained from 
                                                 
105 Sam McAughtry, McAughtry’s War, 7. 
106 A fire broke out while he was on guard one night, and the military court 
questioned him incessantly, wondering if he started it as an act of “sabotage.” 22. 
 49 
critiquing Eire‘s position throughout his memoir.107 Even others, such as Ray Davey or 
Major James F. Hickie, who were on the front lines of battle, did not assert any contempt 
towards De Valera‘s policy. This expression, or lack thereof, contrasts markedly from the 
U.S. war correspondents and newspapers that criticized Eire for standing back while 
others fought for their freedom and for not helping the British when they were in dire 
need. 
In fact, the only time these veterans refer to Irish neutrality is when interviewer 
Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon explicitly asked about the issues in relation to their 
involvement in British forces. To Major James F. Hickie, a Roman Catholic from north 
Tipperary, his nationality did not make a difference while serving with the British 
military and the only time he discusses the issue of Irish neutrality is when comparing 
―the lack of adventure‖ people had serving in the Irish army compared to the British.108 
When returning to Ireland during the war Hickie encountered no problems. Lydia 
Johnston, an Anglo-Irish from Limerick who joined the British Auxiliary Territorial 
Services (ATS), claimed that she ―never encountered any‖ tensions between those that 
joined the British forces and those that didn‘t.109 From Johnston‘s interview, she states 
that her and her family were very ―anti-Dev,‖ but looking back even she still wasn‘t sure 
that Ireland should have entered the war.
110
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These recollections only represent a sliver of the experiences tens of thousands of 
Irish men and women who served in the British forces between 1939 and 1945 had, but 
they illustrate how it was possible for Irishmen to enlist and fight in this war while also 
understanding the political realities of neutrality.  They weren‘t critical towards 
neutrality, even though they themselves risked their lives fighting in the Second World 
War. Even if an individual didn‘t join the British military themselves, most knew 
somebody who was serving abroad.  Although these experiences represent how Irish men 
and women supported the British war effort by joining the British military, their 
engagement in the British army also show how dedicated the Irish government was 
towards neutrality and how the people as a whole supported neutrality. For instance, even 
though hundreds of thousands of Irish citizens were in the British forces, the Irish 
government offered no help in relaying information on the status of loved ones and the 
newspapers were prohibited from mentioning any names due to censorship.
111
 Censorship 
was key to de Valera‘s policy of neutrality, giving a public presentation of impartiality in 
order to prevent any trouble of belligerents, and therefore publicizing information on 
Irish servicemen in the British Army was out of the question.
112
  Yet, individuals still 
joined knowing that families would have a very difficult time in keeping track of them.  
As Lydia Johnston notes, ―so many young people, ordinary people, joined up and their 
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parents were always coming to my father to find out what had happened to them. They 
thought having been in the Army he would be able to find out.‖113  
While trying to grasp the perspectives on Irish neutrality it might seem irrelevant 
to look at those Irishmen who fought for Britain from Northern Ireland, however they 
highlight the broader complexities and connections between Ireland and Great Britain.  
Not only did these Irishmen from all thirty-two counties interact with one another while 
fighting abroad, but as seen earlier, Irish men and women as well as members of the 
Allied forces traveled between Northern Ireland and Eire while station in the north.
114
  
Furthermore, Northern Ireland was technically a belligerent nation, yet even there, the 
war effort was unable to garner as much support as other parts of the United Kingdom.
115
  
For instance, conscription was never implemented in Northern Ireland because British 
officials felt that it would do more harm than good.  The beliefs of a large minority of the 
Northern Irish population, who always felt more connection towards Ireland than towards 
Great Britain, is noticeable. These Catholic, and many times nationalists, would have 
preferred to remain neutral just as Eire had, which was why Northern Ireland‘s Lord 
Craigavon and even Prime Minister Winston Churchill refrained from implementing 
policies like conscription.  
The history of Ireland, and how Irishmen remembered it during the Second World 
War, largely prevented them from joining the war.  Irishmen could not and would not 
forget their tumultuous past with Great Britain, which led them to fight for independence 
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two decades previously and also led to the controversies surrounding partition. An issue 
that has been very much alive since, and by joining Great Britain they not only would 
have to have forgotten their hostile past with them, but they also would question their 
own sovereignty from the British Crown. The Irish could not overcome this relationship 
with Great Britain. Yes, most of them sympathized for the British cause and wanted them 
to come out on top, but John P. Duggan notes, for many Irish they still wanted, ―them to 
get a kick in the arse for what they did with the burning of Cork and the terrible behavior 
of the Black and Tans. I mean, all you had to do was mention the Black and Tans and the 
leaves would wither, wouldn‘t they? Because their behavior was so terrible.‖116 
Even though the experiences of Irish men and women throughout this chapter has 
shown a lot of unity and camaraderie, whether through the Irish soldiers fighting abroad 
or going on leave in Eire, there still were and are underlying tensions within the society.  
The same old rivalries that have plagued Ireland for centuries are apparent from the 
moment the war ends with the burning of the Irish tricolor by students at Trinity College 
Dublin. That, along with Churchill‘s condemnation of Irish neutrality and de Valera‘s 
response shows the deep-seated antagonisms.  The critics of Irish neutrality, whether 
Churchill, student demonstrators, or even American war correspondents cannot overlook 
the historical memories and issues that were very much alive for the Irish people.  
Because as irrational as these sentiments may or may not be, the Irish and critics of 
neutrality alike, agreed that they gave de Valera no option but neutrality if he wanted it to 
be supported by the nation.   
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Along with the significance of the Irish past that must be kept in mind when 
criticizing Irish neutrality, one still cannot ignore the obvious benevolence that Ireland 
and the Irish people had towards the Allies. Thousands of men and women joined the 
British forces, risking their own lives for the cause.  In their recollections of serving, none 
of them criticize or question Irish neutrality, perhaps because they understood the 
political realities of it.  Not only that, but it is apparent that throughout the rest of society, 
on at least some level, the majority of people pulled for the Allies. It must be taken into 
account that their perceptions could be slightly skewed. After the atrocities of Nazi 
Germany became apparent, of course Irish people would want to highlight benevolence 
towards Great Britain and the Allies. Nevertheless, based on these sources it must not be 
forgotten that a significant number of Irishmen fought for the British cause while the 
majority of the population supported, and in some respects, even enjoyed the benefits of 
neutrality. Although most of these recollections reminisced fondly on Irish neutrality, the 
next chapter will look some critics of Irish neutrality: American war correspondents. 
They visited Ireland from the warzone of England, seeing a vibrant social life, plates full 
of food, and also, stubborn Irishmen. They saw Ireland‘s wartime experience in many 
ways as selfish. The Irish were enjoying themselves, oblivious to the realities of the war, 
while people throughout the United Kingdom feared night after night the bombs raining 
down from the German Luftwaffe, allowing the Irish to remain at peace.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE “IRRATIONALITY” OF IRISH NEUTRALITY:  
AMERICAN WAR CORRESPONDENTS AND EIRE 
 
The 1940 war is very far away to him. Rather would he talk 
of the time in 1014 when the Dalcassians of County Clare 
drove the Danes out of Ireland. Rather would he talk of 
Michael Collins and of how back in 1920 when there was a 
price of 40,000 pounds on his head he would walk gaily 
along O’Connell Street every day, rubbing elbows with the 
Black and Tans. 
- Quentin Reynolds, The Wounded Don‘t Cry117 
 
During the Second World War, the opinions and critiques of American war 
correspondents towards neutral Ireland were reflective of the contemporary British point 
of view towards their former ―countrymen,‖ or as many would say ―colonists.‖ Before 
the United States entered the conflict on the Allied side, most Americans stationed in 
Great Britain and throughout the European theatre of war identified with the British 
cause.  As stated previously, they were highly critical of Ireland‘s neutrality, viewing it as 
irrationally ignoring the dangers posed by Nazi Germany as Great Britain and her people 
paid the price for Ireland‘s peace.  These Americans witnessed the horrors of the Second 
World War throughout Great Britain, seeing not only the devastation and destruction 
caused by the German Luftwaffe but also the courage and sacrifice of the British 
character.  Because Ireland remained neutral throughout the war, most Americans who 
traveled and reported on Eire from 1939 to 1941 only visited Ireland while based in Great 
Britain.  Almost immediately, they recognized the drastic differences and attitudes of the 
Irish, who lived less than one hundred miles away from Britain and the warzone.   These 
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journalists, along with many other Britons and Americans, asked the question: why 
wouldn‘t the Irish join in the British war effort? Did they not realize their fate was tied up 
with the British? Why not let the British use their vital seaports? How could they not see 
that the future of civilization hangs in the balance? Quite frankly, from their encounters 
with the Irish, they saw Eire‘s reasoning and position in the war as ridiculous compared 
to the enormity of the Second World War. 
These American war correspondents traveled to Eire for various reasons 
throughout the war: whether it was in anticipation of a Nazi invasion, to try and convince 
the Irish to participate in the war effort, or simply to escape the warzone for a time. 
Several of these Americans who made short trips to Eire and reported on her neutrality 
included Ben Robertson of New York‘s PM newspaper, Quentin Reynolds representing 
Collier’s magazine, Helen Kirkpatrick of the Chicago Daily News, Vincent Sheean 
writing for the Nation, and Roi Ottley also reporting for PM. Although this chapter will 
explore a variety of American war correspondents and their experiences and reporting‘s 
in Ireland, it primarily focuses on Robertson and Reynolds. They are just two of the many 
Americans who lived in Great Britain for an extended period of time during the war; 
however, their recollections, reporting, memoirs, and correspondence highlight the 
perspectives and issues facing these American journalists who reported on Eire. They 
demonstrate the impact and the realities of living in wartime Britain, but also display how 
Americans—from a neutral nation as well—could view the Irish and Irish neutrality as 
absurd in the first two years of the war.   
 56 
Both Quentin Reynolds‘ book on his wartime experiences, The Wounded Don’t 
Cry (1941), and Ben Robertson‘s I Saw England (1941) along with various other cables, 
articles, and letters, highlight important areas of and reasons for American criticism 
towards Irish neutrality.
118
 What they witnessed throughout the war compared with their 
brief experiences in Ireland make their perspectives very understandable, and in many 
ways justified, even if they overlook occurrences of Eire‘s benevolence towards the 
Allies, such as the hundreds of thousands of Irish men and women in the British forces.
119
  
Reynolds was on the front line with the French Army before escaping France via Pointe 
de Graves.  Arriving in London thereafter, Collier’s sent him to Dublin in anticipation of 
a Nazi invasion.  After spending a couple weeks in Ireland, Reynolds would go back to 
London to endure the horrors of the Blitz, publishing these early wartime experiences in 
1941.  In I Saw England, journalist Ben Robertson also published his recollections of the 
early part of the Second World War after residing in London from June to December 
1940. While stationed in London, Robertson visited Ireland for several weeks in early 
November 1940 alongside Helen Kirkpatrick and Vincent Sheean, which reinforced his 
criticisms towards Eire‘s policies and their neutrality altogether.  Robertson traveled the 
world as a war correspondent and would return to Britain the following year, even 
visiting Northern Ireland in the summer of 1941 before his untimely death aboard the 
Yankee Clipper en route back to London in February of 1943. While living in and 
reporting on places such as Great Britain, reporters similar to Robertson and Reynolds 
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saw the dire situation of the British war effort alongside Irish neutrality. Instead of 
highlighting the benevolence that the Irish government had towards the Allies and the 
participation of Irish men and women towards their neighbor, American reporters saw a 
peaceful nation with a vibrant social life, whose neutral policies were hurting the 
courageous Britons who were in dire need of assistance.  
 In order to better understand the critiques posed by American war correspondents, 
one must first understand the circumstances in which they came from, and the 
experiences they endured before they came to Ireland. Everywhere and everybody in 
Britain was affected by the war, whether it was the threat from the air or in being rationed 
just enough to get by—as in receiving an egg a week, if lucky.120  The German ―Blitz‖ on 
the United Kingdom, an attempt by the Luftwaffe to break the English spirit by attacking 
populated civilian areas, lasted from September 7, 1940 until May 1941. The devastation 
resulted in over 60,000 deaths, tens of thousands injured, and even more homeless.
121
  
Germans attacked almost every major city in United Kingdom, including Belfast, 
Coventry, Liverpool, Bristol, and of course, London.  Ben Robertson himself, who did 
not reside in London throughout the entire attack, experienced over 500 air raids.
122
  The 
widespread destruction of German bombs hit both Reynolds‘ and Robertson‘s residences 
while they were in London, the Lansdowne House and Waldorf Hotel.   
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Americans based throughout Great Britain saw first hand the brutalities of warfare 
unleashed under the Nazi regime, and the accounts of Reynolds, Robertson, and a handful 
of other Americans vividly portrays the effects that this had on them and their 
perspectives on the war.  Every night there was a full moon, these Americans alongside 
the British population would fear the worst.  They saw the fires, the broken glass, the 
destroyed homes and buildings, the injuries, and even the deaths. They visited and slept 
in the underground bomb shelters along with thousands of others, and they would work 
with Londoners throughout the days to clean up the rubble and destruction from the night 
before.  Even the American ambassador, Gil Winant, was seen throughout London 
helping Londoners put out fires or clear rubble.
123
  An excerpt from Ben Robertson‘s I 
Saw England shows just how widespread the bombings hurt and transformed the lives of 
people all around them: 
Maude [his chambermaid] was bombed out and lost all she had. She said it did not 
matter, nothing mattered but beating Hitler. The waiter lost his sister, one of the 
men who worked at the Western Union office was injured in a raid, and Johnny 
Johnstone at the Commercial Cable office left his mother-in-law‘s dinner table 
and went out into the garden and gathered parts of a crashed airman in a 
basket…my room was bombed at the Waldorf and I moved to the front of the 
hotel. And there came the day when the doorman did not show up for work. No 
trace of him was every found, so we decided he must have been hit by a bomb on 
his way home—he must have been demolished.124   
 
Through these harsh realities of wartime England, American reporters painted a 
very positive picture of the British character, which withstood these brutal attacks.  From 
his first impressions of wartime London—arriving right after the evacuation of 
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Dunkirk—Robertson recalled the determination of British citizens to prepare the city for 
what seemed like an imminent German invasion.  He tried to tell himself that, ―I could 
not allow myself to be swept away in a day, that there were many more things that had to 
be studied—I must form a careful unbiased opinion,‖ but ―just the same I knew from that 
time on that there was courage and bravery and determination in the British capital.‖125  
Or as Helen Kirkpatrick put it, reporting on one of the first nights of the Blitz in 
September 1940, in Britain ―there is some terror, but nothing on the scale that the 
Germans may have hoped for and certainly not on a scale to make Britons contemplate 
for a moment anything but fighting on.‖126 Not only were Americans awed by British 
attitudes and actions, but what they witnessed made them want to be a part of this fight 
against the Axis powers. Ben Robertson and Edward Murrow were not particularly 
Anglophiles before the war, however, after living in Britain during the war, they became 
strong advocates of Great Britain fight as well as American involvement.
127
 Others as 
well, such as American Bill Greiger, who initially volunteered for the R.A.F. for a pure 
sense of adventure, remembered the exact moment in which the British people made him 
realize that their cause was his as well. While in London, Grieger witnessed a man 
working to defuse a bomb in a deep hole in the street, surrounded by calm and collected 
people.  In this experience, Greiger asserted that, ―you get caught in that kind of courage, 
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and then pretty soon you say, ‗now I want to be a part of this. I want to be part of these 
people. I want to be a part of what I see here and what I feel here.‖128 
According to the accounts of American reporters, the remarkable attitude and 
perseverance of Londoners was reflected throughout the rest of the nation as well. They 
traveled throughout the United Kingdom witnessing and reporting on what life was like 
for Britons during the war. They witnessed horrors beyond the imagination in their roles 
as war correspondents in the early years of the Second World War, which shaped their 
opinions of the war, and the dire need for Americans as well as the Irish, to aid Britain in 
her struggle for existence.  Quentin Reynolds gives one of the most moving descriptions 
on how these reporters felt about this phase of the war and their experiences in it.  While 
attached to a London ambulance unit responding to bombing in a residential area, one 
German bomb fell through a house that they came upon, killing all inside, and Reynolds 
exclaimed that:  
This is the war I see. If you want a front seat to the war come and stand over this 
three-year-old child with me. Don‘t be afraid of the bombs that are falling close or 
the spent shrapnel that is raining down on us. You want to see what war is really 
like, don‘t you? Take another look at the baby. She still looks as though she were 
asleep. This is war—fall style, 1940. This is the war that Herr Hitler is waging.129  
 
Even if the reports and articulations on Britain‘s lone stand against in the Nazi‘s in 1940, 
such as this assertion made by Reynolds, were part of a larger effort to convince 
American as well as Irish opinion to join the cause, one cannot deny that these firsthand 
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experiences shaped and cemented the political as well as moral attitudes that these 
journalist had towards neutrality.
130
  
 Not only was Britain being pounded by the German Luftwaffe, but in the first 
years of the war they were experiencing military defeat after military defeat.  One of the 
most vital battlegrounds was the war at sea for the British.   The Atlantic was Britain‘s 
―lifeline,‖ supplying food, raw materials, troops, and equipment from North America and 
other places.  If they lost this, it would probably lead to wholesale defeat in the war.  In 
1940 alone, the U-boat threat resulted in the loss of over a thousand Allied ships, with an 
average of three ships a day in September. Not only that, but a large number of sinkings 
in the North Atlantic in late 1940 occurred off of the Irish coast, shaping popular opinion 
even further against Irish neutrality, and especially against the Irish refusal to allow 
Britain to use naval and air bases to aid in their defense of the Atlantic.
131
  Here, the 
British saw the negative effects of Ireland‘s neutral policy, whose ports they occupied 
only a couple years beforehand, while they also feared a German invasion of Ireland, 
creating an easy stepping stone to Britain for Hitler and the Third Reich. 
In such dire circumstances, on top of the close proximity and position of Eire to 
Britain, it is not difficult to see why the British wanted to use Ireland‘s key ports, or even 
simply have the Irish help contribute to their war effort.  The writings of these Americans 
stationed in Britain reflect this perspective on Irish neutrality.  Arriving from belligerent 
England, journalists like Robertson and Reynolds were shocked at what life was like just 
                                                 
130 Robert Cole, Propaganda, Censorship and Irish Neutrality in the Second World War 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006). 
131 Clair Wills, That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second 
World War (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2007), 114. 
 62 
across the Irish Sea. To Robertson, who arrived in Dublin after experiencing two months 
of the Blitz, claimed that, ―it was like reaching heaven to arrive in Dublin from the 
battleground of London.  All the burden of the war was lifted from you, and there was 
light about you and a feeling of airiness, and suddenly you were free.‖132 Reynolds 
reiterates this sentiment in The Wounded Don’t Cry, writing, ―coming to Ireland after the 
nightmare and death of France and after the tension and horrible feeling of dreaded 
anticipation in London was like emerging from a dark, dank swamp into the brilliant light 
of the sun…there were no blackout and no soldiers on the streets.‖133 
After Reynolds‘ experiences with the chaos of France in 1940, and the destruction 
throughout England that Robertson witnessed, it is not surprising that both saw Ireland as 
such a haven.  As noted in the previous chapter, Eire did feel the effects of the war, 
having to ration some items, and experiencing fuel shortages, and off-target bombing 
raids. To visitors from elsewhere in Europe, however, it was a drastic change of scenery.  
In fact, when Robertson arrived, he, along with fellow American journalists in Dublin, 
Wally and Peggy Carroll of the United Press and Ed Angly of the New York Herald 
Tribune, watched the lights in the streets come on, and even counted them, being, ―the 
only light between Moscow and New York.‖134  Not only were the lights a significant 
change from the blacked-out cities of Europe, but also the selection of food was an 
enormous change for these reporters, even though they themselves were better off than 
most Londoners while in England.  For Reynolds, ―there was a heaping plate of golden 
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butter on the breakfast table alongside a filled sugar bowl—two things the eyes of this 
correspondent had not seen for many a long day.‖135 When Robertson first arrived in 
November of 1940—―the waitress must have thought she had a starving customer on her 
hands, for she brought out sixteen lumps of sugar, twenty-one pats of butter, four 
sandwiches, a buttered muffin, a pot of coffee, and a half dozen cakes.‖136 Yet, it was 
only ―for those with money [that] there was still plenty of everything except Petrol.‖137 In 
reality, the poorest sections of Irish society suffered severely from ―half-hearted‖ 
rationing system, whereas in Britain, ―wartime rationing had the effect of raising nutrition 
levels for the poorest in society.‖138  However these reporters, who stayed in some of the 
most luxurious hotels Dublin had to offer, would not have known nor noticed the 
detrimental effects of wartime rationing in Eire, instead they perpetuated the ―idea that 
Ireland was a land of plenty‖ while Britain suffered defending democracy.139  
These reporters went to Eire not just because it was a relative break from war-torn 
Britain, but also because many thought that an invasion of Ireland was very likely in 
1940.  In a letter to Ben Robertson, Helen Kirkpatrick states that she ―spent three 
heavenly weeks in Ireland,‖ as a nice break form England.140 One, Quentin Reynolds, 
visited in anticipation of a Nazi invasion.  He went over immediately after arriving in 
London from France, and after he, ―found that smart Ed Angly of the Herald Tribune had 
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sent a man to Dublin; Ray Daniels of the New York Times had someone sent over; Chris 
had hurried a man to Ireland; Bob Low of Liberty Magazine was on his way; so was 
brilliant Virginia Cowles of the Sunday Times‖—all were predicting an invasion.141  
According to Reynolds‘ sources, ―the best minds of Fleet Street‖ and the people in the 
War Office, Air Ministry, and Admiralty thought Hitler would move to Ireland next 
because ―Germany would have as much trouble grabbing Ireland from de Valera as 
Wallace Beery would have had snatching a peppermint stick from Shirley Temple.‖142 As 
Robert Fisk observes, the common belief in the weeks and months after Dunkirk was 
that, ―a German invasion of Ireland might even precede an invasion of Britain,‖ and in 
reality there was a German plan to invade Ireland.
143
  
Regardless of the potential for invasion it is clear that for an American visitor life in 
Dublin was much easier than Britain during the war. Although there were real threats of 
invasion, Vincent Sheean explains in August 1940, only a few months after Dunkirk, 
that, ―as the war went on without approaching any nearer to Irish shores, there was a 
general relaxation of tension in Eire.‖144 However, even with this more relaxing 
atmosphere, these reporters still did not find it as ―charming‖ as one would think.  As 
Robertson explains, ―you would think all of that would have had a soothing effect on an 
American escaping from London, but, as a matter of fact, it made you very restless. You 
found when you were away from London, and the full moon shone, you could not keep 
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from worrying. You worried about London and about everyone you knew in London.‖145 
Not only that, but as both these reporters note and historians have acknowledged, the 
British and these Americans saw Ireland‘s neutrality as essentially insensitive.146 Ireland 
and her people reaped the benefits of staying at peace, while the British fought for 
themselves and even Eire‘s peace.  In I Saw England, Robertson sums this sentiment: 
They were quite willing to accept the protection of the British Empire, but that 
was as far as they intended to go—if England lost the war, they knew Germany 
would swallow up Eire anyhow, and if England won, then Eire could go right on 
being Eire, without having been bombed. Ireland had become one of those 
countries that expected to ask and to receive.
147
  
 
 Not only were these reporters critical of Ireland‘s neutral stance because they saw 
that Ireland‘s fate was wrapped up with Great Britain, but the situation in Ireland also 
deeply unnerved them.  When Reynolds visited immediately after Dunkirk in June 1940 
and Robertson just a few months later, a German attack was a real possibility.  The 
encounters that both Reynolds and Robertson had with Irishmen during their visits did 
not make them feel any better about a potential invasion.  Instead, they saw most of the 
Irish population as ambiguous towards a German invasion. Or, they saw something even 
worse: the Irish believed that they could resist the Nazis and prevent the Germans from 
using Eire as a base against the British.  In Sheean‘s article, written after firsthand 
experiences in Ireland, ―one finds it downright pathetic that the Irish should place such 
faith in their own courage when it is, practically speaking, weaponless.‖148 These 
American reporters could not understand how the Irish refused to see the frailty of their 
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position.  How could they not feel obliged to help the British out in any way possible, 
like by letting them use their ports?  And even most of them got along very well with the 
Irish, as Reynolds explains: 
Oh, but you wanted to scream at these happy, lovable, charming people and tell 
them to wake up, destruction might be just around the corner. But they‘d slap you 
on the back and Jack Arigho [Irish rugby player] would go to the piano and play 
Minstrel Boy, and sing it in his high, sweet voice, and Pat O‘Loughlin would 
make another speech of welcome in Gaelic which not a man in the room would 
understand, for only three percent of the people of Eire know the mother 
tongue.
149
 
 
Reynolds‘ describes how he tried to reason with the Irish and explain their predicament, 
but besides the Irish military build-up, the people would not listen to his warnings. These 
experiences differ slightly from what the recollections and interviews of Irish discussed 
in the previous chapter, but they both show that overall the Irish were not interested in 
formally joining the Allied war effort, and in many ways reflect the notion that, ―people 
enjoyed themselves while they could.‖150  
 In fact, many of the observations made by these reporters are similar to what the 
Irish themselves remembered about the war, even if most of these Americans looked at it 
with a much more critical, eye.  For instance, Quentin Reynolds describes the impressive 
build-up of the Irish military during his travels throughout the country. Reynolds believed 
that the Army was the only segment of the Irish population that took the threat of 
invasion seriously, strategically placing Army brigades and using the Irish terrain to their 
advantage. Not only that, but Reynolds even obtained an interview with Eamon de 
                                                 
149 Reynolds, The Wounded Don’t Cry, 117.  
150 Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, The Irish Experience During the Second World War: An 
Oral History (Portland: Irish Academic Press, 2004), 46. 
 67 
Valera, who impressed him and was very much concerned with the potential German 
threat.
151
 
These reporters also saw that the vast majority of the Irish supported neutrality, 
and that they would fight against the Germans alongside the British if they were invaded. 
This notion of Irish benevolence towards the Allies was supported by the recollections of 
the Irish men and women themselves as well as by the analysis of historians.  For 
example, Robert Fisk devotes an entire chapter to the ―W Plan,‖ which was an agreement 
made between Eire and the United Kingdom, giving the British permission to enter Eire 
if Germany invaded.
152
 Even though these reporters found ―deep sympathy‖ amongst the 
Irish for Great Britain, they still were highly critical and disagreed with the Irish.
153
 This 
is seen with Robertson‘s explanation of the Irish position towards the ―treaty‖ ports, 
―they took the stand De Valera had taken—they assumed their right to neutrality on the 
most unassailable moral grounds. Their right to sovereignty was involved, and I formed 
the conclusion that they were going to keep their sovereignty if they lost the last shred of 
it.‖154  
 More than anything, the commentary of these American journalists on Ireland 
illuminate that in large part, a highly contentious history separated Eire from joining the 
Allied war effort. Like the recollections of Irish men and women, the Irish that these 
American journalists confronted about Eire‘s neutrality would cite the brutalities and 
degradation that the British subjected the Irish to for centuries.  As Sheean explained, the 
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Irish ―are the heirs of 700 year struggle against England, and until the actual moment 
when they face the German invader, if that moment ever comes, they will continue to 
think the British more dangerous to them than any other race.‖155 For Ben Robertson, 
when trying to better understand Ireland‘s position in the war, the Irish would talk about 
Ireland‘s freedom, their ―tiny world‖ ignoring the realities of war, the Black and Tans, 
and ultimately, the Ulster question.
156
  The memories of these Irish men and women, both 
those who interacted with these journalists and others who have reminisced on Ireland 
and World War II, display what was at the heart of Ireland‘s neutrality: their contentious 
past with Great Britain.  In fact, while visiting Armagh almost a year later, Robertson 
cabled back to New York a public statement made by Cardinal Joseph MacRory 
regarding conscription in Northern Ireland. Even though Belfast was bombed by the 
Germans, MacRory passionately disputes notions of conscription because it ―does not 
touch the essence of the question, which is that an ancient land, made by one God, was 
partitioned by a foreign power against vehement protest of its people, and with 
conscription it would not seek to compel those who still writhe under this grievous wrong 
to fight on the side of its perpetrators.‖157  This statement not only shows that many 
throughout Ireland were still bitter about British rule of Northern Ireland, but also that for 
some Irish, such as Cardinal Macrory, the historical memory with the British is one of 
oppression. Why, then, should they join the fight as these war correspondents want and 
believe they should? 
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In remaining neutral Eire cemented its sovereignty from Great Britain, something 
the Irish saw as a centuries-long struggle, while refusing to acknowledge Britain‘s 
political hold over Ulster, which Ireland‘s constitution claimed as a part of the nation.  In 
addition, neutrality meant that they didn‘t have to formally ally with their historic 
aggressor and would be able to remain at peace throughout the brutal conflict.  As 
―selfish‖ as their neutrality may seem, it was a logical political decision and clearly 
supported by the vast majority of the population.  Robertson and others experienced the 
horrors of the war largely at the expense of innocent English men and women, and to see 
the Irish nation sit back peacefully, even they understood that how Ireland remembered 
their past, prevented Eire and her people from supporting the war.  
However, in the United States, not everybody was critical of Irish neutrality as 
these reporters were. In fact, not only do the newspapers explored in chapter four show 
points of understanding that Americans had for Irish neutrality, but also Ernest Boyd 
wrote in article in Foreign Affairs in January of 1941 specifically in response to these 
critical American war correspondents.  Boyd was born in Ireland, but he lived in and was 
reporting from the United States. To him, those news correspondents in London are 
responsible for misconceptions, ―they have gone over to Dublin for a few days, stressed 
the absence of darkened streets and air raids, talked to a few very cautious officials, 
listened to ironical or jocular comments in bars and clubs, and have solemnly reported 
that the Irish are hopelessly, short-sighted and incredibly irresponsible.‖158 Boyd explains 
the Irish the position of neutrality and defends it on key issues, such as the ports.  Britain 
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relinquished them to the Irish in 1938, something he asserts these journalists are leaving 
out or misconstruing to the American public.  In addition, Boyd attempts to describe and 
explain the issues over Northern Ireland, and that, the Irish would never side with the 
British as long as their country is partitioned.  Even more, Boyd describes the underlying 
historical issues, ―Eire knows little about Nazism and Fascism…the only people behaving 
like fascists that the Irish Catholics have ever seen were the British Black-and Tans.‖159 
That is a very bold and contentious statement to make, but it illuminates how Boyd tries 
to rationalize the Irish position.  It shows the historical obstacles standing in the way of 
Ireland‘s involvement in the Second World War.  In Boyd‘s explanation, it does not even 
matter what the Nazis or the British stand for, what does matter is Eire‘s history with the 
British.  Boyd does acknowledge the participation of Irishmen towards the British cause; 
however, his argument has just as many points of contention as the war correspondents. 
Neither will succumb to the other‘s rationalizations on Irish neutrality and its relations to 
the British Empire. 
 But even with these defenders of Irish neutrality, as seen with Boyd, and the 
assertions of the Irish themselves defending neutrality, the overall projection of 
Americans stationed in the European theatre of war was highly critical. Not only did they 
see Ireland‘s fate tied up with Britain, but also that Ireland was deeply dependent on the 
British for their well-being. Yet, as these journalists reported, the Irish did little more 
than express their sympathy towards the British cause.  Robertson even asked them, ―who 
brought their overseas food,‖ the answer clearly being the British, in a way to understand 
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how they could not ally with the British.  All the Irish said was that, if Britain stopped 
trading food, petrol and other supplies, then they would have no cattle from Ireland.
160
 
These assertions, which seem harsh in the context of the Second World War, when they 
so dependent on the United Kingdom, display how strongly some Irish felt towards 
neutrality over allying with the British. Because as the Irish saw it, their position of 
neutrality was grounded by many reasons, and as Packard explains, Ireland was ―fueled 
by centuries-old hatred for England, depleted of 400,000 of its citizens by an almost 
literally thankless role in World War I, exhausted by a struggle for independence that was 
followed by a civil war, and, finally embittered by the islands partition.‖161 
Even though individuals similar to Ben Robertson were well aware of these 
reasons given for Irish neutrality, they still were not satisfied with them. For instance, 
shortly after Robertson left Ireland, he received a letter from Senator James F. Byrnes 
dated December 9, 1940: 
While I hope you succeeded in convincing officials of the Irish Free State of the 
correctiveness of your views, I have my doubts. The attitude of De Valera has 
been a terrible disappointment to me. In the past England did everything possible 
to antagonize the Irish people, but in recent years their attitude has been entirely 
different and it is unfortunate that De Valera and his people cannot forget the 
wrongs of the past.
162
 
 
The Irish, in turn, were perplexed and annoyed that these criticisms of neutrality came 
from a neutral nation. One, Robertson told a group of Irishmen that he believed 
Americans overall would want Ireland to relinquish their ports, and that America 
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respected and acknowledged their independence but found that helping England win the 
war was the most important aspect.  In response, ―they asked me why America, which 
was at peace, should try to involve peaceful Ireland?‖163 It was not unusual for 
Americans such as Robertson to be supportive of Great Britain; in fact the United States 
neutrality was very pro-British in their policies before Pearl Harbor, as seen with the 
Lend-Lease act. However, while the majority of the U.S. supported their own neutrality, 
many Americans alongside these war correspondents were critical of Eire‘s position. By 
early 1941, 62% of Americans polled by the New York Times even believed that the Irish 
should scrap their neutrality.
164
 Yet, it must be kept in mind that much of the U.S. press 
and coverage on Eire came from these war correspondents, who clearly wanted the Irish 
to join the war. 
These reporters condemned Irish neutrality because they saw ―the reality of its 
[Eire‘s] geographical position‖ on the edge of world conflict on top of their experiences 
in the war zones and amongst the innocent victims in Britain.
165
 Nevertheless, from the 
Irish perspective, one can see how they would be skeptical of a neutral American coming 
to neutral Ireland and trying to convince them to enter the war.  But these reporters 
criticized not just Irish neutrality while in Britain; they also ridiculed United States 
neutrality.  By examining Ben Robertson‘s cables back to the United States while visiting 
Northern Ireland in the summer of 1941, one can see how frustrated he was with 
American neutrality as he reported on Irish neutrality.  In Robertson‘s travels around 
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Northern Ireland, he is acutely aware of the religious and nationalistic divides that marred 
the six counties since their inception. For instance, he cabled that, ―you hear Orangemen 
in Belfast referring scornfully to Southern Irishmen as crying beer drinkers and poets, and 
Irish nationalists will tell you that Orangemen do a lot of talking about being loyal to the 
crown but what really touches an Orangemen‘s heart is a half crown (two shilling and a 
sixpence).‖166 Although he ridicules both sides for the intense divisions in the society, 
Robertson is much more critical of Eire than he is of Northern Ireland, concluding that 
those six counties are very much a part of the war effort, even if they did not implement 
conscription because of the discontent from Irish nationalists and their Southern 
neighbor.  
 In Robertson‘s criticism of the political divisions in Northern Ireland, and of Eire, 
he ignores the contributions that the Irish did have towards the British war effort.  Yes, he 
admits that the Irish sympathized with the British, but he fails to acknowledge that tens of 
thousands of southern Irishmen volunteered and fought for the British Empire—a 
contribution that is dually acknowledged by Boyd in his defense of Eire as well as in 
several newspaper articles. Or that, as Eunan O‘Halpin asserts, at many times Ireland‘s 
neutrality favored the Allies so much so that it ―became an almost full alliance.‖167 
However, reporters such as Robertson would have a harder time understanding the 
realities of Irish neutrality, considering that Eire‘s government did everything possible to 
project the policy of complete neutrality.  Most of the concrete evidence of the Irish tilt 
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towards the Allies has only become available in the last few decades.  Nevertheless, 
Robertson emphasizes the unhelpful, difficult aspect of Eire‘s neutral stance throughout 
his cables.  
While there, he made visits to both Catholic Cardinal MacRory and Protestant 
Archbishop Gregg. These experiences were drastically different. The Cardinal 
immediately told him he had ―no regard for American people,‖ and shortly after speaking 
with him abruptly left. Whereas the archbishop, told him that President Roosevelt was a 
great man and the two spoke for half an hour on how the fight against Germany was very 
much a Christian crusade.  In his reporting on Northern Ireland, Robertson uses these 
divisions to criticize and articulate his position on American neutrality—something, 
which surely would move an American audience reading these articles and cables.  After 
explaining in detail divisions in Northern Ireland, Robertson broadcasts his real feelings 
towards American neutrality: 
In Northern Ireland the majority is fighting but in America not even the minority 
has succeeded in doing anything about our fighting. We are divided worse than 
they are. In Belfast you find yourself saying why do we at home keep on 
trembling at edge of precipice. What is it that holds us back—is it fear is it lack or 
resolution is it lack of leadership. You find yourself saying again and again and 
again that it is better to be bombed than it is to say to the world that this is our war 
and then to allow another countrys men to die for us in our battle. It is not 
honorable it is not worthy of us—our fathers would be ashamed of such conduct. 
In Belfast you find yourself wondering what has become of that sense of destiny 
which used to inspire us. What does Hitler care about our elaborate political 
maneuvering? What does he care about all speeches we have been making. All 
that Hitler asks of us is to stay out of war until end of this summer. He will have 
us then, we will have contributed our fullest measure to our own defeat….this is 
the saddest most heartbreaking July in all history of the American world
168
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Ben Robertson, along with almost a majority of his fellow Americans stationed in 
Britain and throughout the war desperately attempted to persuade the United States to 
enter the fray.  Robertson is highly critical of neutral Eire, but as one can see, he is also 
vehemently against American neutrality.  And, as Americans stationed in Britain, they 
were constantly being questioned and cornered by Britons about America.  The British 
were constantly looking for answers that would relieve some of their fears and anxieties 
of the war, looking for support.  This is seen from Lynne Olson‘s portrayal of U.S. 
ambassador Gil Winant as a major advocate for U.S. aid and effort towards the British 
cause, to Ben Robertson‘s firsthand experiences as a resident of London.  
The reality was, however, that America remained neutral for a good portion of the 
war, especially during the perilous months of the Battle of Britain. Its neutrality, like the 
Irish, was supported throughout the nation, even if not as fiercely as in Ireland. This 
perplexed the Irish. Americans were criticizing their neutral stance, urging them to 
relinquish their ports and air bases, but America herself remained peacefully neutral until 
attacked at Pearl Harbor. Americans were more removed from the war, no matter how 
much these journalists, politicians, and reporters wanted them to join the war.  They 
criticized Ireland‘s neutrality, the people‘s ambivalence towards immediate threats and 
their lack of aid to the British in the most ominous circumstances, such as the Battle of 
the Atlantic, but America was in a similar situation. They had the potential to aid Britain 
much more in the beginning of the war, and most of these war correspondents saw that.  
Like Ed Murrow, who upon return to America in November of 1941 was utterly appalled 
at what he saw.  Like many others in his situation, ―Murrow had trouble coping with the 
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sheer normality of America, the seeming lack of concern about the fighting and dying on 
the other side of the ocean, the apparent refusal to acknowledge that America had any 
stake in the outcomes of this cataclysm.‖ In fact, after seeing the situation and attitudes in 
the United States, compared with what he knew was happening in London, Murrow 
ended up, ―spending most of my time trying to keep my temper in check, so many well-
dressed, well-fed, complacent-looking people.‖169 
 These Americans and war correspondents had good reason to fear British defeat 
and Nazi takeover, however they still do not represent the American opinion on the war.  
As seen with the American newspaper coverage on the war, and of Ireland, the United 
States remained neutral and undecided on issues like Irish neutrality until Pearl Harbor.  
Perhaps that is because of the large Irish-American population, Anglophobia, or because 
living thousands of miles of the warzone, Americans could not possibly comprehend the 
real horrors of war experienced by those like Robertson or Reynolds. War correspondents 
in Britain, no matter what nationality, witnessed the destructions caused by the Third 
Reich and the innocent victims involved.  They saw the undefeated mindset of the British 
and their stance against this heartless foe.   
 When arriving in Ireland or even the United States, neutral nations at peace, after 
experiencing the destruction, fear, and realities of 20
th
 century warfare, of course they are 
going to be shocked. Not only that, but the Irish were threatened with the same 
destruction, yet they still did not help the British fight the Nazi‘s as a nation, even if 
thousands of Irish men and women joined the British forces and the country‘s sympathies 
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laid with Britain. They saw the Irish as selfish, and perhaps rightfully so. These 
journalists saw that Ireland‘s history with Britain stood in the way of their involvement. 
The historical memories of centuries of brutalities, the question over partition, the 
bullying of the England, they all were at the forefront of the Irish stance of neutrality. 
Looking at the Irish, these were reason enough to stay neutral—even Irish volunteers 
explored in the previous chapter did not call into questions de Valera‘s policy. But why 
not pursue a policy that will help secure national sovereignty and keep the Irish from the 
destructions of war?  Ben Robertson, Quentin Reynolds, Helen Kirkpatrick, Vincent 
Sheean, and the other American journalists saw this Irish mindset as irrational. To them, 
the Irish needed to get over their divisions and centuries-old conflicts with the British in 
face of German threats.  Overall, these American war correspondents could not and 
would not see eye to eye with the Irish.  They saw the historical issues in the war, but 
knew they could never wrap their brains around the Irish‘s justifications.  As Reynolds 
states: ―To understand the Irish one must study them at long range. You cannot get to 
know them by living with them. You will get to know that they are lovable and honest 
and very brave, but this is no understanding.‖170  And though much of this chapter 
explores the critiques American correspondents had of Irish neutrality while America was 
also neutral, the critiques were only amplified after the United States entered the war. 
Though America‘s entry was ―bound to affect the attitude of the average Irishman,‖ as 
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the U.S. newspaper coverage further testifies, Ireland held firm to its neutrality against 
growing American criticisms.
171
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SYMPATHETIC TO NONSENSICAL: HOW U.S. 
NEWSPAPERS COVERED IRISH NEUTRALITY 
 
Americans should have no difficulty in understanding the 
position the Irish have taken regarding participation in the 
war. It took Ireland centuries to do what was done here 
during the seven years of the American Revolution. 
- New York Times, March 16, 1941 
 
From the recollections of the wartime experiences of Irish men and women to the 
commentaries of American war correspondents visiting Ireland, one can see how various 
perspectives on Irish neutrality developed.  The oral histories and memoirs of Irish men 
and women demonstrate how Ireland‘s experience with neutrality was widely supported 
throughout the nation and in many ways benefited Eire.  However, from perspectives of 
American war correspondents, coming to Ireland from the battleground of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland‘s position was not only frustrating but in many ways 
incomprehensible. This perception was exemplified by the experiences of Americans Ben 
Robertson, Quentin Reynolds, and the U.S. ambassador to Eire, David Gray.
172
  Whereas 
the previous chapters discussed how the Irish viewed neutrality as well as how the 
experiences of American war correspondents shaped their opinions on Eire‘s neutral 
stance, this chapter will examine how American newspapers portrayed Irish neutrality to 
the American public throughout the war.   
Although some of the articles published in American papers were written by the 
very war correspondents explored in the previous chapter, such as Ben Robertson‘s 
                                                 
172 T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the U.S.A., 1939-1947 (Maryland: Rowman and 
Littlefield Inc., 1977). 
 80 
reporting for New York‘s PM, the American papers‘ coverage‘s and criticisms of Ireland 
in the Second World War are more reflective of the United State‘s overall position in the 
worldwide conflict. American neutrality, along with the large Irish-American influence in 
the United States allowed for a more objective depiction of Irish neutrality in U.S. papers, 
whether they were articles written by or pertaining to Irish-American support for Eire or 
simply covering Ireland‘s perspective on major issues, such as the continuing controversy 
over Irish ports.  Even though criticism also arose from U.S. papers such as PM, the New 
York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal before December 1941, they did 
so alongside other articles that explained or sometimes even defended Ireland‘s neutral 
position. However, once the United States joined the war, fully committed to the British 
and Allied cause, U.S. coverage on Eire and Irish neutrality grew increasingly critical.   
This chapter explores the coverage U.S. newspapers gave Ireland from 1939 until 
the end of the war. Eire rarely received front-page attention, remaining on the periphery 
of war coverage in the United States; however, the coverage that was given by U.S. 
papers is worthy of attention.  It furthers the historical understanding of Ireland during 
the Second World War by examining how the small, island nation was portrayed in the 
press of one of the major combatants.  Additionally, U.S newspapers illuminate yet 
another way Americans viewed Eire and the war apart from the war correspondents. They 
show that coverage pertaining to Ireland during the war predominantly reflected the 
geographical isolation of the United States from the European war and the changing 
position of the U.S. from a neutral nation to a belligerent. 
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From the beginning of the war, people in the United States, although well aware 
of the conflicts abroad, were distanced from the war compared to those in Britain or even 
in the Irish Free State, allowing for a more objective view on Ireland to be taken until the 
U.S. became openly involved. The U.S. was 3,000 miles away from the European theatre 
of war, feeling no immediate threat of invasion like the British and Irish feared after 
Dunkirk.
173
 Furthermore, in being so far away the United States did not have to worry 
about aerial bombings of its cities, a devastating consequence of belligerency in Second 
World War Europe. As seen in the previous discussion of American war correspondents 
in Britain, this was part of everyday life and was even felt in parts of neutral Ireland as 
well. Ireland was bombed several times on ―accident,‖ and Eire aided Northern Ireland 
with fire brigades and ambulances after the Luftwaffe struck Belfast.
174
 Even after the 
United States entered the war, Americans felt the repercussions less drastically than in 
Great Britain or even Ireland. In Great Britain it is estimated that 62,000 civilians died 
throughout the war, compared to the United States, where besides the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, barely any civilians died unless they were actively involved in war zones abroad, 
such as volunteer ambulance drivers or journalists.
175
  More than a year before the United 
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States even joined the war, air raids had already killed 14,000 civilians and injured over 
20,000 in the United Kingdom.
176
   
Although hundreds of thousands American lives were lost or maimed fighting in 
the war, a majority of people back home still felt the effects of war less than those in Eire 
or especially Britain. Rationing in the United States did not begin until spring of 1942, 
and the cutbacks were less widespread than in the island nations of Great Britain and 
Eire, who were dependent on war-torn shipping lanes for a large portion of their 
commodities. In the United States, basic items were rationed, such as sugar, meats, 
cheese, shoes, fuel, oil, and coffee from 1942 until the end of the war.
177
 Although an 
American could not purchase as much as they might want from the store each week, they 
still could get ahold of these items and they were not in as short supply as in Great Britain 
or Ireland.  In neutral Ireland, Clair Wills emphasizes that the poorest sections of society 
struggled with wartime cutbacks.
178
 And even those that had wealth to purchase 
necessary foodstuffs, cutbacks affected the nation at large.  Almost everyone in Dublin 
relied on bicycles for transportation while the population turned to burning turf as a major 
energy source.
179
 In Great Britain, rationing was even more structured and lasted well 
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after the war ended.
180
  Lynne Olson emphasizes the stark differences in rationing 
between the United States and Great Britain in her study of Americans in London, 
explaining that in the United States, ―eggs, which were almost nonexistent in Britain 
became a meat substitute in America. Margarine took the place of butter, and when sugar 
was rationed, it was replaced by corn syrup and saccharin,‖ and although restricted, 
―American motorists never had to give up their cars entirely.‖181 Looking at rationing 
alone, the differences between the American experiences and the experiences of those 
living in the European war zone or on the edge of it are clear.  In fact, one could argue 
that the Irish had more reason to join the war than Americans, who were clearly more 
distant from its direct impacts.  
Therefore, when exploring how American newspapers covered and presented 
Irish neutrality to the larger American audiences, it must be kept in mind where they were 
reporting from and who their intended audiences were.  Reporters such as Robertson and 
Reynolds were highly critical of Irish as well as American neutrality because of what 
they experienced in Britain; however, most Americans supported neutrality until the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. Additionally, articles cabled to the United States from places 
London or Dublin are more representative of the respective cities in which they were 
written.  For instance, reports out of London tend to explain the significant consequences 
of Irish neutrality and why Eire‘s position could be detrimental to Britain‘s war effort.  
This is seen with Raymond Daniell‘s 1940 article, cabled from London to the New York 
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Times.  Daniell covers the secret meetings that occurred after Dunkirk, when the 
governments of Eire, Northern Ireland, and Great Britain met to discuss Eire‘s weak 
defenses and a potential Nazi invasion.
182
 He writes that it, ―clearly indicates Premier de 
Valera is again blackmailing the British Government to end the partition and this at the 
very moment when an enemy is at our gates.‖183 As Robert Fisk has argued, British 
officials were willing to negotiate an end of partition in June 1940 if Eire entered the war, 
but Churchill and de Valera could not agree on the terms.
184
  Nevertheless, Daniell‘s take 
on the meetings represent Britain‘s critical sentiments towards de Valera and Irish 
neutrality.  On the other hand, articles sent from Dublin paint the Irish position more 
positively. Just four days after Daniell‘s article, Harold Denny cabled from Dublin to 
report Eire‘s build-up of arms in order to defend the nation from an invasion. Denny 
explains that most Irish sympathize with the British in spite of their fervent neutrality but 
cannot join the war because, ―as the average Irishman sees it, Ireland contributed 320,000 
volunteers to the British forces in the World War and for a reward got Black and Tan rule 
after the war.‖185 Denny‘s article was inevitably influenced by his surroundings in Ireland 
and the prevalence of censorship in Eire during the Second World, but regardless his 
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article alongside Daniell‘s shows the varying perspectives covered in U.S. newspapers 
depending on where they were reporting.  
Additionally, the coverage given to Eire differed slightly amongst these U.S. 
newspapers. All of these papers covered major events and issues of the worldwide 
conflict; yet, they each had differing foci and political slants. For instance, the Wall Street 
Journal, a financial and politically conservative newspaper, covered Eire throughout the 
war in articles pertaining the Ireland‘s commercial and economic interests.186  Also, The 
Wall Street Journal covered Ireland less thoroughly than other American papers such as 
New York Times or Washington Post, both of whom allot a significant amount of 
coverage to the international scene. As Aurora Wallace states, for the New York Times it 
was ―particularly important for the paper to serve the local audience well with substantive 
foreign news. With a large and growing population, many of whom were newly arrived 
immigrants from Europe, readers were more demanding of complete coverage of events 
back home.‖187 The coverage given to Eire in the New York Times was, like the other 
papers, increasingly critical of Eire, however it also reflected the large Irish-American 
population in the United States and the New York area, covering groups in the United 
States that supported de Valera‘s policy such as the Friends of Irish Neutrality. The 
attention given to Eire by the New York Times and the Washington Post, two of the 
largest American papers even during the Second World War, was relatively similar. Both 
of these papers prided themselves on giving fair, substantive news reports, and their 
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reports on Ireland during the war reflect the overall importance of Eire as it pertained the 
United States.  
 Even though Eire was rarely ever front-page news, American readers were 
informed of Ireland‘s neutrality and experience in the war alongside other articles 
presenting the brutalities of the war—at many times making Ireland‘s neutrality look 
ridiculous in comparison. For instance, PM, a newspaper that reflected owner Ralph 
Ingersoll‘s ―political commitments to the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, the labor 
movement, and anti-fascism,‖ would print articles relating to Ireland‘s refusal to allow 
the British military use of their ports alongside articles such as ―What Germany Did to 
Poland.‖188 This article and similar ones, like ―German Bombs Are Doing This to 
England,‖ presented American audiences with graphic images of the destruction and 
brutalities committed by Germany‘s Third Reich upon innocent civilian victims.189 So, 
although not every article pertaining to Eire outwardly condemned Irish neutrality, the 
reader could not help but question how Eire could remain neutral in the face of these 
criminal actions committed by Hitler‘s regime and the threat that Germany posed of Eire 
herself.  
 The coverage given to Eire in PM was much more critical than the other papers, 
yet, similar to other papers such as the New York Times and Washington Post, the 
criticisms relating to Ireland‘s neutrality only grew. This reflects the findings of Michael 
Carew, who argues that American newspapers along with Americans grew more and 
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more supportive of war from 1939 to 1940.
 
Newspapers increasingly portrayed the 
international scene as an extreme threat to American life, and most Americans ―relied on 
its news media for its perception of foreign affairs.‖190 Throughout, U.S. press coverage, 
regardless of their focus or political leanings, gradually portrayed more of the negative 
consequences and effects of Irish neutrality as the war progressed further and the U.S. felt 
more threatened by the Nazi menace.  
Overall, coverage of Irish neutrality published in the United States reflected the 
American interactions and involvements with Eire, Great Britain, and the war. Before the 
U.S. entered, newspapers did not display the same sense of urgency to join the war and 
help the British in whatever way possible that Americans in London did.  Instead, the 
press reflected that U.S. interests were with a British victory but that the U.S. was still 
technically neutral. This is evident in from the economic developments within the United 
States as well as the government‘s Lend-Lease agreement with Great Britain, which gave 
the United States temporary use of British seaports in exchange for desperately needed 
war materials. Even before U.S. entry into the war, the United States in many ways 
profited from the war and rearmament.  For example, in June 1940, PM published the 
article, ―Ford Gets Plane Engine Contract: British Order 6,000 and U.S. Contracts for 
3,000,‖ speculating that this was leading to a prosperous economy and showing the 
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support that Americans had for the British.
191
  Just a few months later Emmett V. Maun 
wrote that, ―steel shares hit a new high for 1940 yesterday‖ with ―the stocks directly 
affect by rearmament profited most.‖192 The growth of the U.S. economy and aid to 
Britain reflect the connections and investments that the United States had with the 
British.  Therefore, it is understandable why articles in U.S. papers would push for 
Ireland to join the war or at least help the British cause by lending the Brits vital seaports. 
However, even with American aid and interest in the British cause, many 
Americans still had deep connections with the Irish, dividing the opinions and viewpoints 
on Irish bases.  Ben Robertson explains this strange position while visiting Ireland in his 
PM article on November 12, 1940:  
When you are away from London you worry. You also as an American worry in 
Dublin about Irish bases—about the attitude of Britain, Eire, and the U.S.A. on 
the question. You understand the Eire position. You understand the British 
position. You understand also that we in America are too devoted to Ireland, and 
at the same time are determined to help Britain win this war. As an American in 
Dublin you realize we have the opportunity to help adjust this situation, for we 
still have a Boston Irish Ambassador credited to London, and we are as anxious 
for Ireland and England as we are for the U.S.A.
193
 
   
Although Robertson and reporters similar to him urged action by Ireland as well 
as the United States, the deep Irish-American connections and significant Irish minority 
left a large portion of the United States supportive of Eire.  The United States was home 
to a very large Irish population, who supported Eire‘s neutrality and rights over her own 
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territory, such as the naval bases, until the United States joined the war and it became an 
essential issue for ―Americans.‖ According to Kevin Kenny, between 1820 and 1920 
roughly five million Irish men and women migrated to the United States, and although 
immigration was cut drastically after the First World War, roughly 260,725 Irish men and 
women immigrated to the United States in the 1920s, 30s and 40s.
194
 Even today, one out 
of every six Americans claim some degree of Irish ancestry.
195
 This very large Irish 
population within the United States is cited prominently alongside articles discussing 
Ireland‘s neutrality.196 From information gathered in U.S. papers, many Irish-Americans 
supported de Valera‘s position of neutrality and the obstacles surrounding a formal 
alliance with Great Britain.  
One of the most heavily publicized organizations supporting Irish neutrality in the 
United States was the group Friends of Irish Neutrality. On December 9
th
, 1940 over 
6,000 members of this group met in New York City and passed a resolution protesting 
―any attempt on part of any belligerent in Europe that would jeopardize peace and 
territorial integrity of Ireland.‖197  From the coverage given, this group firmly supported 
Ireland‘s position in the war, especially regarding the Irish retention of the treaty ports. 
The group even hosted a rally in honor of visiting General Frank Aiken, Eire‘s Minister 
for Coordination of Defensive Measures. Here, where ―the Irish flag—green, white and 
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orange—hung over the platform between two American flags,‖ an audience of 4,500 
Americans cheered on the Irish minister, widely supporting Eire‘s determination to 
remain neutral and keep her bases from British occupation.
198
  At the time of the Second 
World War, PM estimated that over 745,000 Irishmen lived in the United States, and the 
prevalence Irish-American and support for Eire is clear.
199
 Some historians, such as T. 
Ryle Dwyer, argue that this population was so influential that the United States could not 
enter the war alongside Great Britain until it was directly attacked at Pearl Harbor.
200
  
However, according to a Gallup poll taken in early 1941, 40% of the large Irish-
American population thought that Eire should let England use her bases.
201
 Nevertheless, 
a significant amount of this large minority within United States supported and 
sympathized with Ireland‘s position before America joined the war.  
Indeed newspaper coverage on Eire in the first two years of the war is at many 
times broadly sympathetic to Ireland‘s position. This is true of all of the newspapers 
discussed in this chapter. For instance, on November 11, 1940 the New York Times 
published ―Bases Mean War, De Valera Insists: Even End of Irish Partition Would Not 
Sway Him, He Says, in Explaining Position.‖ This article briefly and sympathetically 
explained Ireland‘s neutrality from the perspective of Taoiseach Eamon de Valera, 
quoting that, ―this question is one which involves our national sovereignty and our 
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people‘s will. It also is one which involves the safety of our people.‖ 202  Not only that, 
but it explained to an American audience that Ireland‘s bases are no comparison to the 
agreement between the United States and Great Britain, lending Americans British ports 
for warships, because America is 3,000 miles away, and if America disobeys strict rules 
of neutrality, they do not have the immediate threat of Nazi attack as Eire did. 
 In response to the 1941 Gallup poll the Washington Post published an article 
entitled ―The Irish Viewpoint.‖ Here, Edward Folliard described how, ―for the Irish to 
turn over their ports to the British would be to ask the Germans to come over and do their 
worst—to do to Dublin and other Irish cities and towns what they had done to Coventry 
and Southampton, with a consequent slaughter of men, women, and children.‖203 Even 
further, the article explains that similar to the United States, Ireland is a republic and the 
majority of the Irish nation supported neutrality. They understood that their fate was 
wrapped up with Great Britain‘s, but the past atrocities committed by the British and the 
threat posed by Germany if they relinquished their ports to the British outweighed the 
benefits. This article—along with many others—described the position of Irish neutrality 
by emphasizing the bitter historical memories held by Irish men and women.   
New York‘s PM even published an extensive overview on Ireland in a Sunday 
edition entitled ―Backdoor to Britain?‖ which highlighted how the past animosities 
between Eire and England prevented Ireland from allying with the British.
204
 After the 
evacuation at Dunkirk, invasion of Britain was a very real possibility, and many feared 
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that the Nazis would first invade Ireland and use it as a base for the larger attack on 
Britain. PM’s article explores how Ireland could be used as a stepping-stone to Britain, 
and why the Irish pursued a policy of neutrality. Explaining that, ―for 600 years the 
relations between England and Ireland have been marked by bloodshed.  The result is that 
Ireland now is divided as the map shows‖ and consequently this ―centuries old struggle 
for liberty help explain Eire‘s determination to remain neutral.‖205  
 The idea that Ireland‘s historical memory influenced their neutral stance was also 
emphasized in articles on American—particularly Irish-American—support for Irish 
neutrality.  American sympathy is clear in the coverage of the Friends of Irish Neutrality, 
but also in other articles such as ―Irish Here Offer Prayers for Peace: If Forced into War 
Eire would become ‗a Mass of Ruins,‘ Father Flanagan says.‖ 206  Here, coverage of an 
Irish-American clergyman illuminates the contentious history of Eire and Britain, and 
that elements within Irish society would rebel against any type of allegiance alongside the 
British in the war. The New York Times and The Washington Post even explain that the 
majority of Irish want England to win because it is in their best interest (Britain is their 
largest trading partner, they support democracy, and cannot fend off the Nazi‘s if Britain 
lost), but they still would like to see Britain ―almost licked‖ due to the political and 
historical differences between the two nations.
 207
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Even though the Irish could not overcome past prejudices to join fully the British 
cause, American newspapers highlighted various ways in which Eire did assist the 
British. Briefly, articles covered the Irish men and women who joined the British forces 
and also how the Irish who remained in Eire helped the British cause and people. One 
way they did this was through negotiations to allow British women and children refuge 
from the bombed areas caused by the German Blitz in England, covered in the 
Washington Post article, ―Asylum in Ireland.‖208 Around the same time (October 1940) 
the New York Times published an article entitled ―Irish Offer Homes to Bombed Britons.‖ 
Here, it was estimated the Ulster and Eire might take 25,000 Britons by Christmas, 
perhaps giving refuge ultimately to more than 100,000.
209
 
American newspapers also devoted significant attention to how the Battle of the 
Atlantic affected the Emerald Isle, whether in discussion of Irish ports, the minefields 
surrounding the island, or the victims who washed up on Ireland‘s shores. As early as 
October 1939, victims of U-Boat attacks landed upon Ireland‘s west coast, such as when 
a German submarine, reportedly responsible for the sinking of the Greek steamer 
Diamantis, dropped off twenty-eight survivors at Dingle, Co. Kerry.
210
 Evident from the 
press coverage on Ireland along with the historical scholarship regarding Eire, an 
increasing amount of Allied as well as ships from neutral nations were sunk off the Irish 
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coast by the German U-boats as the war carried on into 1940 and 1941, amplifying the 
debate over Irish ports. In early November 1940, Hanson W. Baldwin‘s article in the New 
York times asserted that ―about 3,400,000 tons of merchant shipping—some 930 ships—
have been lost by Britain,‖ since the war began, with 420 of them sunk since June 1st of 
that year.
211
  As this war at sea intensified, Britain looked to Eire as well as the United 
States for aid. The U.S. responded with the Lend-Lease Act, in which the British lent the 
U.S. naval bases in return for old U.S. battleships from the First World War. In spite of 
sympathy for Eire; however, U.S. newspapers also pressed the issue of allowing the 
British to use the Irish ports that they controlled only a few years previously.
212
  
American press thoroughly covered the Irish ports controversy, reporting on both 
the British and Irish perspectives, yet, they presented more of a British perspective.  
While discussing the ―peril‖ of British merchant and naval shipping, the Associated Press 
reported that, Winston Churchill ―spoke bitterly…of the fact that Britain‘s warships and 
planes cannot refuel at the ports of neutral Ireland and said this, ‗is a most heavy and 
grievous burden.‘‖213 PM reported that ―a vigorous demand for British bases in Eire came 
today from representatives of all parties and from the British press…the lack of such 
bases was handicapping the Royal Navy in combatting the growing menace of German 
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U-Boats.‖214 Press coverage described the ports as rightfully British. In early 1941, the 
American Institute of Public Opinion found that 63% of Americans wanted Ireland to 
cede its bases to the British cause.
215
 Whether this reflects the American benevolence 
towards Great Britain in policies like the Lend-Lease or the influence of American 
newspapers describing the perilous condition of British shipping, it does show that a 
majority of Americans did not support Irish neutrality while the U.S. remained neutral. 
The same poll taken a year later, after the United States joins the war, reported that 90% 
of Americans now wanted Ireland to join the war and allow the British to use their ports, 
showing the changing interests on the war once the U.S. joined as well as the growing 
criticisms towards Irish neutrality. 
 Besides the major issue of Ireland‘s ports, American press also touched upon 
significant events pertaining to Ireland, such as the bombings of Belfast as well as 
Dublin. For instance, when Belfast was bombed in late spring 1941, the New York Times 
commented on the rare amity between the Irish on both sides of the border in the article, 
―Barriers Burned Away.‖216 And the Washington Post explained that southern Irishmen 
do not see Northern Ireland as a foreign country, and when they were bombed, ―neutrality 
was thrown to the winds,‖ as Eire rushed aid to Belfast.217 Just a few weeks after Belfast 
was blitzed, ―Dublin was bombed for the second time, and in that bombing 27 persons 
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were killed and 80 injured.‖218 The bombings of neutral Ireland, which ―neither the 
Dublin government nor the Irish people are under any illusions as to who was 
responsible‖ also brought further speculations by the press to the American people on 
Eire‘s neutrality and whether or not this would encourage her to help the British.‖219  
The negative effects of Irish neutrality were also highlighted in American 
newspapers, not only in terms of massive British losses in the Atlantic, but also in the 
reports of IRA actions or even the political policies, such as censorship, pursued by the 
Irish government. The Irish government imprisoned thousands of IRA suspects, as the 
press notes, and the majority of Irish people full-heartedly supported their government 
and its policy.
220
  However, at times the coverage given by U.S. newspapers on the I.R.A. 
present the organization as a lingering menace.
221
 For instance, on March 22 the New 
York Times reported that ―four hundred armed men of the outlawed Irish Republican 
Army, defying the Ulster Government‘s ban on demonstrations in commemoration for 
the Easter Week rebellion of 1916, paraded through Belfast.‖222 PM asserted while 
describing Ireland‘s neutrality that, ―the most fanatical workers for an end of division 
between Northern Ireland and Eire are members of the illegal Irish Republican Army, 
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which has been charged with dozens of bombings,‖ and warned that, ―Germans might try 
to use IRA to help weaken Ireland.‖223  
Beyond coverage of the IRA, coverage on Irish censorship presented negative 
aspects of the Irish government to the American people.  Eire established ―rigid press 
censorship forbidding correspondents to send out-of-the-country uncensored reports of 
any events connected with the war.‖224 By looking at the reports given by the U.S. press, 
it is evident that the American public was aware of, at least to some extent, Eire‘s 
extensive censorship.
225
 O‘Drisceoil highlighted the thoroughness of Ireland‘s censors, 
which regulated newspapers, literature, film, and even news on fellow Irishmen fighting 
abroad.   
The negative consequences of Irish neutrality were present in American 
newspapers even before U.S. entry into the war; however, once the attack on Pearl 
Harbor happened, critiques in the American press on Irish neutrality only grew. While 
American newspapers continued to criticize Irish policies such as censorship, stating that 
it was, ―unduly rigorous for a country that is not at war,‖ articles sympathizing with and 
explaining Irish neutrality slowly dwindled.
226
 When the United States first entered the 
war, U.S. media speculated that Ireland might join the war as well because the strong 
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U.S.-Irish ties would swing Irish public opinion towards joining the war. On January 26, 
1942 the Washington Post suggested that with ―the entry of the United States into the war 
an increasingly larger section of Irish opinion is being persuaded that neutrality cannot 
much longer be maintained. Naval and air bases in Western and Southern Ireland are so 
essential to the whole Anglo-American strategy in the Atlantic that sooner or later the 
Irish government must yield.‖227 PM reported that a ―settlement on Irish naval bases 
predicted,‖ in January 1942.228 Newspapers thus made it seem only natural for Eire to 
join the war now that the United States shed its neutrality. 
When Eire continued to remain neutral, however, defenders of Irish neutrality 
were portrayed as ridiculous. After American troops landed in Northern Ireland in early 
1942, de Valera accused the United States for violating Eire‘s neutrality.   The 
Washington Post published in article illuminating the flaws in Eire‘s position on Northern 
Ireland.  Explaining that, ―the protest against the landing of American troops in Ulster is 
based on the theory that Eire, in refusing to recognize the partition created by the Anglo-
Irish treaty of 1921, considers the six counties of Ulster part of its own territory,‖ 
however, if this is how the government in Dublin felt about Belfast, it is worth noting 
that, ―no protests, as far as we can discover, were dispatched to Berlin about the repeated 
bombardments of Belfast.‖229 Even more critical were Ralph Ingersoll‘s comments on de 
Valera‘s protests: 
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Funny people the Irish. A day or two ago I would have said they did not care who 
laid down his life that they might remain free—an Englishman or a Chinaman or a 
Russian. But now it seems they are getting choosy. De Valera‘s protested our 
landing troops—even across the border in Ulster. What‘s the matter? Aren‘t we 
good enough to make the supreme sacrifice so that the Irish may have the 
privilege of going on fighting among themselves? Mayn‘t we help make sure they 
are undisturbed by Nazi firing squads, Nazi hangman, Nazi axmen, Nazi machine-
gun murderers of hostages, Gestapo concentration camp guards and all the other 
symbols of fascism?
230
 
  
Although this was just a postscript to his larger article pertaining to Egypt‘s neutrality, it 
represents the same criticism that reporters like Quentin Reynolds held before the United 
entered the war:  Ireland‘s fate was tied up with the British, yet they refused to help out in 
the war effort.  Not only that, but it makes de Valera, and therefore his entire policy, look 
ridiculous in the face of the larger concerns of the war.  
Irrespective of these issues regarding U.S. troops in Northern Ireland, the 
coverage of U.S. newspapers on Ireland grew simply because the proximity of American 
interests to Ireland grew. Tens of thousands of American troops were stationed in 
Northern Ireland, and naturally American papers covered the activities of their soldier‘s 
abroad and where they are located.  Newspapers reported on Ireland for many reasons. 
The New York Times published an article entitled ―Our men in Ireland urged to be 
cautious: Guide Book Advises A.E.F. to shun controversial topics,‖ which provided an 
overview of the advice given to U.S. troops as well as the factious climate through 
Ireland.  Because ―Ireland sent many gifted and valuable citizens to the United States,‖ 
American soldiers were told that, ―we Americans don‘t worry about which side our 
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grandfathers fought on in the Civil War, because it doesn‘t matter now. But these things 
still matter in Ireland and it is only sensible to be forewarned,‖ so, ―don‘t argue religion,‖ 
and ―don‘t argue politics.‖231 Beyond the advice given to American G.I.‘s, newspapers 
also touched on Americans who visited southern Ireland.
232
 However, the newspapers 
only reported from the policy of the U.S. military, which formally banned soldiers from 
visiting neutral Ireland. They made no mention of the hordes of US soldiers who 
frequented Dublin while on leave.
233
  
These reports were not necessarily critical of neutral Eire, but they highlighted the 
rifts between de Valera‘s neutral government and Northern Ireland along with the United 
States. Additionally, they represent what interested U.S. journalists visiting Ireland and 
what they believed the American audience wanted to know about the Emerald Isle.  But 
as the U.S. forces in Northern Ireland grew and invasion of the continent neared, 
American press became much more critical of Ireland‘s neutrality. They gestured that 
Axis spies crossed into Northern Ireland from the South, ridiculed the Irish government 
for hosting enemy delegations after the American note was published, and at times, even 
accused Eire‘s neutrality of favoring the Axis powers.    
For example, the New York Times reported on September 21, 1942, that 
(according to article‘s title), ―Pro-German Irishmen Spy on U.S. Troops in Ulster.‖234 The 
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article conceded that most Irishmen are pro-British, but went on to explain how ―the 
infiltration across the Eire border to North Ireland of numbers of South Irish who are 
sympathetic to the Nazis has caused trouble that is growing as the size of American 
forces and installations increases.‖235  Concluding that, ―as long as Eire maintains her 
present neutral position those working on the problem [spying] will be handicapped.‖ 
Other articles further supported the threat that Irish neutrality posed to the American War 
effort, such as the coverage on two Irishmen who parachuted into southern Ireland from 
German planes to work as spies for the Nazi regime in early 1944.
236
 Not only do these 
articles highlight major flaws in Irish neutrality, as seen by Americans, but also it further 
separated the interests and understandings of Irish neutrality from the American 
perspective. 
The biggest criticism of Irish neutrality seen in American press reports 
surrounded the ―American Note,‖ which asked the Irish government to expel the Axis 
legations of Japan and Germany leading up to D-Day; a request Ireland refused to grant.  
U.S. papers made clear that the ―note‖ was sent to the Irish government, ―based on the 
contention that there were espionage activities that constituted a danger to the lives of 
American soldiers and to the success of the Allied military operations.‖237 However, U.S. 
newspapers also heavily cover the accusations made by Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
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and sent to de Valera by the U.S. ambassador to Ireland David Gray, which ―stated flatly 
that Ireland‘s neutrality was operating in favor of the Axis and against the Allies.‖238 
This accusation presented to the public via these U.S. newspapers (that Eire‘s 
neutrality favored the Axis) was clearly wrong.
239
 Nevertheless, these articles represent 
the growing criticisms on Irish neutrality from the U.S. perspective. Once America gave 
up her neutrality and as American interests in Ireland and their neutrality grew, it was 
only natural for Americans to have a more critical eye towards Eire‘s policy. Some 
Americans, like Ben Robertson, found faults in Ireland‘s neutrality from the beginning of 
the war, which could only be magnified after experiencing the Blitz in London.  
Robertson along with other American journalists such as Ralph Ingersoll, viewed Eire‘s 
neutrality as Summer Welles put it in a Washington Post article—as Ireland having ―been 
able both to have its cake and eat it.‖240 Because the Irish have not suffered ― the hourly 
fear of Nazi attack,‖ and that ―the strong right arm of the British armed services, whether 
the Irish appreciate it or not, has saved them‖ from a Nazi invasion.241  
In spite of these accusations and criticisms, the Irish people still supported 
neutrality. They could not overcome their past with Great Britain, which was described 
by the Irish themselves, told to the American journalists visiting Eire, and explained to 
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the American populations through various press reports. This issue of the Irish historical 
memory with Great Britain is further supported by the fact that the Irish neutrality 
allowed them to avoid the devastations of modern warfare as well as unite and appease 
the various factions through the small nation. Nevertheless, as the war progressed, these 
explanations or understandings of Ireland‘s neutrality slowly seemed more and more 
preposterous to the Allies, and it is reflected in these papers as well as in the accounts of 
the journalists. Nonetheless, it is important to see how these newspapers primarily reflect 
the political alignment of the United States. They were much more understanding of Irish 
neutrality before the U.S. joined the war because America‘s strong ties with Ireland and 
the fact that America was also neutral. 
In many ways the situation in America was similar to that in Ireland. The U.S. 
was not only neutral, but as Edward R. Murrow‘s experience shows, going back to 
America from war-torn Britain was very close to the American journalists visiting Ireland 
just across the Irish Sea. As stated previously, in Murrow‘s visit back to New York in 
November 1941, a friend described him as having, ―trouble coping with the sheer 
normality of America,‖ and ―the apparent refusal to acknowledge that Americans had any 
stake in the outcome of this cataclysm.‖242 This mirrors some of the largest criticisms that 
Americans had of neutral Ireland; that they remained at peace while the British sacrificed 
everything to stave off the Nazis.  The growing critiques of Irish neutrality present in 
American papers alongside the American journalists, who lived in Britain and only 
visited Ireland for short period, highlight how perceptions of Ireland‘s neutrality are 
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directly related to the environment in which they originated.  But even with all of these 
changing and at times conflicting views on Irish neutrality, Eire remained on the 
periphery of world conflict, not as many in Britain and America wished, as one of the 
Allied nation. 
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CONCLUSION 
 From this study, it is evident that surrounding Ireland‘s neutrality were conflicting 
and evolving opinions.  Yet, even with these passionate critiques of Irish neutrality, 
especially from the American war correspondents, Ireland was only important as it 
pertained to the larger world conflict. The most prevalent criticisms on Ireland arose at 
the height of the Battle of the Atlantic, when Britain‘s hold was wavering, and then again 
during Allied preparations for the invasion of continental Europe, where Eire and its 
people were viewed as a security threat to American lives and the Allied war effort at 
large. Even though Ireland and her policy only sparked the interests of foreign onlookers 
on the periphery of the larger, major wartime events and issues, studying the experiences 
of Ireland‘s ―Emergency‖ and her critics illuminates the conflicting interests and opinions 
of individuals as well as nations. Showing that the attitudes on Ireland‘s neutrality, both 
from American reporting and the Irish, reflect the self-interest of those involved.  
While looking back upon Irish neutrality—exploring the Irish viewpoints, the 
Irish interactions in and with the war, and even Eire‘s detachment from it—the contours 
of Irish neutrality are justified, or at the very least understandable. Irish men and women 
supported neutrality, they were seemingly united under the policy, and even those that 
physically fought for the British refrained from criticizing or even commentating on 
Eire‘s neutrality. That being said, it is important to bear in mind that, in hindsight, 
Ireland‘s policy during the war may seem inevitable. However, if somebody other than 
Taoiseach Eamon de Valera headed the Irish government, Eire‘s role throughout the war 
could have been drastically different. Under de Valera‘s leadership, he implemented 
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heavy censorship and publically emphasized nationalistic sentimentalities alongside the 
justification of Eire‘s neutrality and right to it. As seen throughout this thesis, many of 
the Irish responses to and reasoning‘s for neutrality reflect those of Eamon de Valera and 
the Irish government. Perhaps this was how the majority of the nation truly felt, or 
perhaps this displays the influential effects of censorship and the government. 
Additionally, the Ireland interned thousands of IRA members throughout ―the 
Emergency,‖ which consequently could have impacted the sense of unity throughout 
Ireland during the Second World War. Whether or not these policies led by de Valera‘s 
government altered the way in which Eire‘s neutrality was viewed and remembered, they 
are important to consider when studying the Irish perspective throughout World War II. 
Similar notions must be kept in mind when delving into the American opinion on 
Ireland throughout the war. Were the Irish really that passionate about the oppressive 
British rule, such as the Black and Tans, as reported by these Americans? Or, was that 
just an easy answer for Irishmen to give an inquiring foreigner? Simply put, the Irish may 
have seen no great need to enter such a large, brutal conflict, but for Americans to report 
the long, embittered Irish history as the main reason for the Irish staying out of the war, it 
made the Irish look more ridiculous to their audiences—promoting their viewpoint on 
Eire‘s neutrality. Regardless of how correct or fairly these Americans interpreted and 
reported Irish neutrality, their criticisms on it can be viewed as reasonable given their 
experiences. As these critics perceived, or at least claimed to, Ireland‘s neutrality was 
based upon historical and political circumstances within Eire; yet, Ireland was just as 
susceptible to the war and its outcome as Great Britain and the rest of Europe. 
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It is impossible to understand what truly drove the Irish to support neutrality or 
the American reporters and newspapers to condemn it, but it is clear that this policy had 
both positive and negative consequences. An obvious benefit of remaining neutral was 
Eire‘s avoidance of the devastating impacts of the blitz.  On the other hand, neutrality 
also had damaging effects, one of which is directly reflected in this historiography of 
Ireland. Because Eire refrained from the war—a war in which determined the fate of 
democracies throughout Europe—it was only after the movement towards Irish revisions 
that historians began to study Ireland during the Second World War in earnest. 
Otherwise, Ireland‘s lack of participation would reflect poorly upon the nationalistic 
interpretations of Irish history.  
The policy of neutrality had many benefits and consequences, yet what is even 
more important is that Eire was able to survive the Second World War. In retrospect, 
Ireland was never invaded by the Germans, the British won the Battle of the Atlantic, 
Eire‘s policies and people favored the Allies, and Eire was able to survive the war as a 
technically neutral nation, unified under this policy. Whether or not Eire‘s entry into the 
Second World War would have altered the outcome of the war will forever be debatable, 
however, the policy of neutrality did affect this tiny island nation thereafter. Criticisms 
towards Ireland continued, especially after de Valera paid condolences to the German 
Minister, Eduard Hempel, following Hitler‘s death. Ireland did not join the United 
Nations until 1955, the Irish people had difficulties confronting the realities of the Second 
World War, and Partition as well as Ireland‘s sovereignty apart from Great Britain was 
further cemented.   
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 During the Second World War, Ireland was a small nation on the edge of the 
European continent, but her policies attracted a variety of opinions and criticisms. 
Irrespective of what motivated the Irish, American correspondents as well as newspapers, 
they all display how differing perspectives on the same policy, one in which was 
supported by the majority of the nation, could form and evolve. Most importantly, they 
illuminate the experiences and agendas of individuals as well as nations in time of war. 
Irish men and women saw the conflict as Britain‘s, and supported the neutrality while 
still sympathizing with the Allies. From the first hand experiences of war correspondents, 
they had a duty to report on what they found most important to American audiences. At 
times this was urging Ireland to relinquish her ports or neutrality altogether, and at other 
times it was persuading the American public to support the United States involvement as 
well. All in all, they never could or would agree upon Eire‘s neutrality—they each 
perceived Ireland‘s dilemma in the Second World War from their own respective angles.  
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